NB Remarkably absent from the document is material from Paul Monk, pending receipt of release from the author.

A very temporary list of internal anchors:

hillel -|- visualizing_quotes -|- visualizing -|- kent -|- guha -|- kmap1 -|- ibis_issue -|- duong_reilly -|- monk_contention -|- thompson -|- ibis_answer -|- lee_problems -|- ibis_structure -|- abduction_intro -|- nosek -|- ibis_argument -|- lee -|- nosek_sense -|- gelder_deliberation -|- garrett_navigate -|- gelder_argument -|- lawley -|- gunn -|- willinsky1 -|- friesian1 -|- gelder_enhanced -|- macrovu_background -|- engreb1 -|- noosphere -|- macrovu_metaphor -|- bdt5 -|- horn_lewis -|- lanham -|- slashdot1 -|- macrovu_criteria -|- macrovu_analysis -|- gebser -|- gelder_skill -|- phil_frame -|- delib_democ -|- chandrakirti -|- odonell_difference -|- ing_darwin -|- equiaeon_kant -|- akt_manifesto -|- schneider_tecfa -|- julien_library -|- rushkoff_obsolete -|- bdt2 -|- bredo_cog -|- bdt3 -|- lerner_valence -|- bdt_feyerbend -|- finnish_context -|- salk

Bibliographical References for this set of documents

"Y. Bar Hillel once said
''I am reasonably sure that humanity spends more time on argumentation in natural languages than on the pursuit of scientific knowledge. It is therefore of vital importance to get better insights into the nature of argumentation in natural languages, and I challenge anyone here to show me a serious piece of argumentation in natural languages that has been successfully evaluated as to its validity with the help of formal logic. I regard this fact as one of the greatest scandals of human existence.''
The forum of equally eminent philosophers to whom he said this was unable to meet the challenge."
Bar-Hillel, Y., & others. (1969).
Formal logic and natural languages: A symposium. Foundations of Language, 5, 256-284.
from Enhancing_Deliberation.pdf; Tim van Gelder

"The difficult part in an argument is not to defend oneís opinion but rather to know it."
Andre Maurois (1885-1967)
French biographer, novelist, essayist
"He who knows only his side of the case, knows little of that."
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
British philosopher, economist

Quoted in Visualizing Argumentation: Software Tools for Collaborative and Educational Sense-Making.
Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum and Chad S. Carr (Eds.)
Springer-Verlag: London 2003

Computer-Supported Argument Visualization
"The American Heritage ® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth
Edition defines an argument to be:
1a. A discussion in which disagreement is expressed.
2a. A course of reasoning aimed at demonstrating truth or falsehood:
presented a careful argument for extraterrestrial life.
2b. A fact or statement put forth as proof or evidence; a reason.
2c. A set of statements in which one follows logically as a conclusion
from the others.
The etymology lies in the Latin argmentum, from arguere which means to make clear. And this is what itís all about. How do we make clear - at least so far as one is willing and able - what we think, what we mean, what we believe and need, so that we can work together to define and solve the problems that confront us?
The above definitions frame argumentation not only as discourse for persuasion, logical proof, and evidence-based belief, but more generally, discussion in which disagreements and reasoning are presented." 

[Note that the etymology parallels closely the definition of the ancient Greek for truth, /alethia/, which is to uncover or make clear. bdt] 

Visualizing Argumentation: Software Tools for Collaborative and Educational Sense-Making.
Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum and Chad S. Carr (Eds.)
Springer-Verlag: London 2003

This language provides a conceptual knowledge framework for the representation of distributed information. Earlier versions of CKML followed rather exclusively the philosophy of Conceptual Knowledge Processing (CKP) (Wille, 1982; Ganter and Wille, 1989), a principled approach to knowledge representation and data analysis that Āgadvocates methods and instruments of conceptual knowledge processing which support people in their rational thinking, judgment and acting and promote critical discussion. The new version of CKML continues to follow this approach, but also incorporates various principles, insights and techniques from Information Flow (IF), the logical design of distributed systems (Barwise and Seligman, 1997).

Barwise, K. J., and Seligman, J. (1997). Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems, Cambridge University Press.
Ganter, B., and Wille, R. (1989). Conceptual scaling, in F. Roberts (Ed.) Applications of Combinatorics and Graph Theory in the Biological and Social Sciences, Springer-Verlag.
Wille, R. (1982). Restructuring lattice theory: An approach based on hierarchies of concepts, in I. Rival (Ed.), Ordered Sets, Reidel.

Conceptual Knowledge Markup Language: The Central Core
Robert E. Kent; TOC (The Ontology Consortium)
Springer-Verlag: London 2003
file:///C|/Documents/Discourse /CKML-ucalgary_ksi_kaw_kent.pdf 

I'm served far better by the timer in my coffee machine than by some beastly apparatus that pretends to the wisdom of Einstein and fails. 

"There are several problems associated with the expressiveness of the language. The computational complexity of inferencing is too high. The language is too expressive for non-logicians to effectively use. It is also very difficult to build graphical interfaces for writing some of the more interesting statements in the language. The only solution seems to be to use extremely limited subsets of first order logic for the meta-content itself. One interesting subset is to use a frames like language with simple inheritance as the only kind of rule. Interestingly, the most important kind of lifting rules, where one context subsumes the contents of another, can be captured as simple inheritance rules. " 

Towards a theory of meta-content

The philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Pierce developed his existential graphs as a formal reasoning technique for logical inference (Roberts, 1973), and in recent years there has been growing interest in formal status of visual proofs in mathematics (Barwise and Etchemendy, 1990; Shin, 1994). In artificial intelligence, Sowa (1984) has developed Peirce's graphs as formal conceptual structures for the representation of logical inference from natural language statements.

Figure 6 [not here included - bdt] shows a conceptual graph from an article by Sowa (1991b) embedded as active hypermedia object within the article using an active document technology that allows the map to be edited within the document processor and interrogated by other programs as a formal knowledge base (Gaines and Shaw, 1993b). The graph represents the English language statement that "Tom believes that Mary wants to marry a sailor." It may be translated automatically into the linear, textual form of conceptual graphs as shown beneath it, and both diagram and textual form may be translated into predicate calculus. The textual form can also be loaded into the PEIRCE (Ellis and Levinson, 1992; Ellis, Levinson and Robinson, 1994) inference engine for conceptual graphs, and queried as a deductive database. " 


"User experience with KMap in various applications has been positive in terms of ease of use of the interface to create concept maps. Users across a range of disciplines have created extensive systems of concept maps and linked annotation related to projects and research topics. There is a wide range of individual variation in the perceived utility of concept maps, ranging from users who find them so natural that they will not undertake a project without first creating maps, to those who do not find such visual expression at all natural. 

The more formal concept maps with well-defined meanings require extensive training in the semantics of the visual language to be used effectively. We have found, as Nosek and Roth (1990) have reported from human factors experiments, that users can comprehend knowledge structures in semantic networks more readily than in textual form. However, in creating maps, users tend to treat formal maps in the same way as informal ones, and generate visual knowledge representations that are meaningful to them but do not comply with the strict semantics of the formal language. Since users have similar problems with expression in the textual form of the specification language, the problem appears to be one of creating precise specifications rather than one of the use of visual languages." 

Concept Maps as Hypermedia Components
15 Conclusions
Brian R. Gaines and Mildred L. G. Shaw
Knowledge Science Institute
University of Calgary Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4
{gaines, mildred}@cpsc.ucalgary.ca

Being issue-based means that whenever there is any misunderstanding or disagreement, the first move is to frame the misunderstanding or disagreement as an issue, or, more precisely, as a question. The creation of the question turns the "argument" into an inquiry -- a dialogue in which the underlying goal is to open up to new possibilities and the mood becomes one of partnership. While this may seem simple and straightforward, in practice finding the best question to ask is an art form. 

"The IBIS Manual" from Touchstone Resources Whitepapers

Structure vs. History
Because this is a dynamical system, the results are difficult to report. As Peter Allen (Ilya Prigogine's co-worker for twenty years), one of the originators of self-organizing social system simulation said, "The richness of human systems, produced by layers of mutual adaptation and initiative and framed by historical circumstances makes each situation `unique'. Case studies may accumulate, but on what principles can general conclusions be drawn?" Graphs of averaged trends, although they do give a good idea of what is happening in a system, do not give a good idea of why it is happening. 
[ NB: aggregation!! - bdt ]

Allen, Peter M.
"Towards a New Science of Human Systems."
International Social Science Journal, February 1989, 41, 81 - 91. 

Deborah Vakas Duong and Kevin D. Reilly
University of Alabama
Birmingham Behavioral Science
Volume 40, 1995, pp. 275 - 303.

My main contention is simple. Using a technique called argument mapping, we can structure, communicate and correct arguments of any degree of complexity with a clarity and efficiency simply unavailable using other means. If we use the technique in a deliberative process, we can govern the deliberation, constrain it from straying off course, target our use of evidence, specify our disagreements, and capture the whole process with an ease and rigour significantly greater than are available using standard cognitive processes.

In other words, we more or less blunder around in the external record system and behave in argument as if we were still sensory beings hunting and gathering in the uncomplicated, primeval sensory world. We conduct complex arguments as if a combination of holistic apprehension, intuitive judgment and natural language were sufficient for handling them. None of us, I think, would consciously make that claim. We do what we do by tradition and by default, not because we have thought through why we do it, how it works and whether it serves us well. Because we have, all of us, read a lot, argued a lot and consider ourselves - if not those we disagree with - to be more or less rational beings, we hold these debates in ways barely distinguishable from the way tribal moots were held millennia ago. We do so because it is not obvious how we can do much better.

The consequence is that, more often than not, reasoning in prose is both poor and poorly communicated. But even where it is reasonably sound, much of it remains obscure to the reader. Commonly, however, argument is just poorly structured and therefore poorly communicated. A central reason for this is that the medium of prose does not lend itself to the clear structuring or communication of reasoning. [...] I submit that this is a dismal state of affairs at a time when, more than ever in the past, we rely on the rapid and accurate communication of analysis and argument. This is what Robert Reich was driving at, a decade ago, when he described the knowledge economy as one in which ''The intellectual equipment needed for the job of the future is an ability to define problems, quickly assimilate relevant data, conceptualise and reorganise the information, make deductive and inductive leaps with it, ask hard questions about it, discuss findings with colleagues, work collaboratively to find solutions and then convince others''" 

Enhancing our Grasp of Complex Arguments
This paper was presented by Paul Monk as a plenary address to the 2004 Fenner Conference on the Environment
Australian Academy of Science, Canberra, 24 May 2004

Bernard D. Tremblay wrote:
> The engagement I refer to as discourse is in many ways similar to affection;
> the participation can be deeply energised by a sense of contribution that
> concretizes the fact of membership, so that the aspect of belonging materializes
> in the role of co-creator and collaborator. 

> In its most perverse form the loyalty and commitment manifests as persistence
> in the face of overt antagonism and explicit animosity, even in the face
> of aggression ... despite? or perhaps because of? 

> As Nicholas Thompson depicts this in "Can online political chat be fixed?"
> (The Boston Globe October 13, 2002):
"The other day, a group of Americans gathered together to deliberate the wisdom of a war with Iraq. D. started it off with harsh words for President Bush, arguing that he just wants a war to distract the nation from other ills: ''Face it America, [Bush] is nuts, and is as dangerous as any outside terrorist we could possibly face.'' K. fired some harsh invective back. ''You moron Hussein butt kissers are proving the fools that you are,'' a retort that E. parried with ''Will you imbecilic right-wing armchair commandos ever tire of calling anyone a `Saddam lover'?'' L. ignored the two prior debaters, looked straight at D., and let it rip. ''You're a moron. I won't even begin to point out all the twisted logic in your [comment].'' But D. had an immediate rejoinder to that: ''Thanks! Coming from you, I'll accept that as a compliment.'' 

If possible, the discussion disintegrated further. Everyone talked past, around, and through each other. No one, presumably, left knowing anything more about Iraq. Of course, this conversation didn't occur at a university round table or in Harvard Square over tea and scones. It took place on the Yahoo! political discussion message board. The potshots above represent just a small sample of the discussion on an early October evening. But many of the 125,000 comments about the war posted in increasing numbers over the last 12 months display the same unedifying, sophomoric tone. 


Unfortunately, as we now know, the masses generally don't want to deliberate or hold anyone accountable online, least of all themselves. Once behind our keyboards we want to rant, belittle, and hoot about sex. The major democracy start-ups of the late '90s have long since closed shop, and many of the top general political sites, including CNN, have shuttered their discussion boards, too." 


Discussion boards devoted to technological and scientific subjects - most notably the popular computer programmer and hacker site slashdot.org - break into far fewer shouting matches; in large part, that's because one can quickly tell whether a poster has a clue. This not only helps users filter out gibberish but also provides disincentives for spouting off. It's vastly easier to rant about even obscure topics related to Iraq - the expected role of the Shiites in the southern city of Basra, for example - than to rant about the Unix underpinnings of the new Macintosh operating system. If you don't know anything about Unix, you can't really say anything. If you don't know anything about Basra, you can still announce that all right-wingers are armchair commandos. And, boom, once a few people have disrupted a political thread, the more level-headed of the original debaters quickly abandon it. 


There is still reason to hope that online political discussion will mature into something truly useful over time. After all, the form has just as many advantages as drawbacks. Yes, online discussion makes empathy difficult, but it also lets people correspond on their own schedules from anywhere in the world. Yes, it allows people to fire off rants, but it also allows them to circulate carefully sourced and annotated arguments augmented with ready access to incredible archives. 


Perhaps online discourse will follow the same arc that so many other Internet phenomena have traced: overenthusiasm, a crash, and then, quietly, something extremely useful rising from the ashes. 


What's the equivalent for online discussion? It might well be the use of the Internet to facilitate small group conversation where everyone involved has a stake in a productive exchange. This approach has proved fruitful in several neighborhood-based discussion groups; indeed, the mayor of Minneapolis, R. T. Rybak, says he decided to run for office because of the Minneapolis-Issues list, an e-mail discussion list dedicated to local political matters that Rybak initially participated in simply as an avid poster. Gradually he made online friends, and, as the discussion of the city's problems evolved, they persuaded him to run and then helped him win. 


A nonprofit called Web Lab (www.weblab.org) has organized effective large group discussions online, most famously over the redesign of Ground Zero in lower Manhattan. Its main trick is breaking people into small groups moderated and coordinated by members with temporary powers to direct the discussion, a simple change that seems to block out most of the anonymous ranting that torpedoes many larger conversations. ''On most message boards, the bad drowns out the good. We've found that, in small groups, the good drowns out the bad,'' says Marc Weiss, the organization's founder. 

Maybe the best evidence that something will ultimately turn the Web into a productive, deliberative forum comes from Fredefrekl. The author of ''mommy, my butt itches'' says he wouldn't send such messages in a small group setting. ''I think what appeals to posters is the mass audience, or at least the potential of a mass audience,'' he writes. ''People,'' he adds, do not look to message boards for ''group therapy,'' but for ''venting.'' 

At least the people who use them now do." 


The Answer Reflex
[...] One reason we have found is that Western society and the educational system seem to have rather thoroughly trained us to always know and say the right answer, and to avoid the vague and weak position of simply asking an open-ended question in a discussion. In other words, the result of years of practice is that most people have a very effective "Answer Reflex," which is the source of the commonly heard discussions of the "Yes, it is!" - "No, it isn't!" variety. 

In a discussion, the original question is quickly overwhelmed by a flurry of countermanding ideas -- proposals, answers, or solutions of some kind -- and tightly bound to those ideas are their justifications. Each justification in turn gives rise to new ideas, each of which has its own justification. A well-functioning Answer Reflex assures that no one asks "What is the question here?" 

This is not to say that people don't frequently ask questions. Indeed, to be a skillful politician or rhetoritician is to make effective use of the interrogative form. However, "rhetorical" questions (e.g. "Do we want another four years of inflation in this country?" or "Are you always this dense?") neither open the dialogue nor foster a mood of inquiry -- they are simply a kind of position or assertion with a question mark on the end, and are very much a part of the Answer Reflex. 

Buckminster Fuller described the Answer Reflex as the "Mistake Mystique": the tendency to avoid both the risk of being wrong and the vulnerability of not knowing by always "knowing the right answer." He pointed out that while this may have been a good strategy for success in our educational system, it has done enormous damage to our ability as a nation to think powerfully and creatively about the complex problems that now face us. 

"The IBIS Manual" from Touchstone Resources Whitepapers

Information and knowledge are growing at a far more rapid rate than ever before in the history of mankind. As Nobel laureate Herbert Simon put it, the meaning of 'knowing' has changed from 'being able to remember and repeat information' to 'being able to find and use it' (Simon 1996). Therefore, the goal of education is better conceived as helping students develop strategies to find useful information, and make sense of it, rather than helping them memorize and retrieve it. This new notion of 'knowing' has become more important with the advent of the World Wide Web (Web), as it brings us a virtually infinite source of information with diverse qualities. 

However, most recent researches have focused on the use of the Web as a virtual space that either allows people in different locations and at different times to collaborate (Pea et al. 1994; Songer 1996) or enable them to share information and knowledge (Scardamalia et al. 1994; Lamon et al. 1999; Linn 2000; Bell 2002). 


Among many difficulties of using Web-based information in education, the size and the speed of growth of information on the Web are the most difficult ones. The Web has brought us virtually infinite information. It contains diverse information in almost every area. Not only are there a great number of possibilities to choose but they also vary very widely in quality. Finding meaningful information on the Web, therefore, is becoming more and more difficult. In an effort to alleviate this difficulty, Web search engines such as Google or Yahoo have emerged. Although Web search engines and Web browsers, which are called conventional Web search environments in this paper, are fairly powerful, they have several shortcomings because they were not developed with instruction in mind (Soloway & Wallace 1997). First of all, as Nordlie (1999) shown, many people have difficulties choosing appropriate search queries. Web search results thus almost always include irrelevant information, and it is essential to refine or extend repeatedly initial Web search results to obtain quality Web search results. Yet, conventional Web search environments do not support this iterative process of refining Web search results. In particular, people need to keep multiple Web browser windows open or use additional software, such as a word processor, to maintain multiple Web search results. 

Another drawback of conventional Web search environments exists in reusing useful Web-based information found from previous Web searches. People often create bookmarks when they want to reuse useful Web resources that they find. Even though bookmarks provide a convenient way to return quickly to useful websites, they do not capture enough Web search contexts (Cockburn & Jones 1996; Wallace et al. 2000). As a result, people often need to go back to each bookmarked Web page before they actually use their bookmarks because the information bookmarks provided, such as the title and the URL of a website, is not sufficient enough to prevent such unnecessary Web navigation. In addition, bookmarks become easily unmanageable because ordinary people rarely categorize their bookmarks (Abrams 1998). 

Finally, although it is very common that many people search the Web on the same or similar topic repeatedly (Markatos 1999), conventional Web search environments are unable to take advantage of previous Web searches, so similar or identical Web searches have to be repeated several times. Owing to these shortcomings, the educational use of the Web has been limited to finding answers to simple, specific closed-ended questions, rather than constructing advanced knowledge from various Web-based information (Wallace et al. 2000). 

Concept Mapping Your Web searches: a design rationale and Web-enabled application
Y.-J. Lee
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
2004 Journal of Computer Assisted Learning 20, pp103 - 113
file:///c:/documents/discourse /concept_mapping_web_searches.pdf 


[IBIS] moves the asking of questions into a central role in the dialogue process (see Figure 2) [not reproduced here - bdt]. In IBIS, ideas are always defined relative to some question. This makes it somewhat more difficult for discussions to devolve to the "Yes, it is!" - "No, it isn't!" cycle, and it creates a discipline of care and rigor about being relevant. Since comments are more naturally addressed to an explicit statement of the question, it becomes more obvious when a discussion has the character of a "Yes, A!" - "No, not B!" cycle, in which two people are vociferously stating non-opposing propositions. 


The heart of IBIS is the matrix of Questions, Ideas, and Arguments that combine together to create a conversation. 

  • Question -- states a question; 
  • Idea -- proposes a possible resolution for the question; and 
  • Argument -- states an opinion or judgment that either supports or objects to one or more Ideas.
Originally "The IBIS Manual" from Touchstone Resources Whitepapers

Bernard D. Tremblay wrote:
> This seems a description of abductive inference in action:
> "When a hypothesis about a particular fact allows us to predict what
> happens, the fact gains credibility as the cause of what has been
> predicted." 
> P=premise,
> HP=hypothetical premise,
> IC=intermediate conclusion,
> A=assumption, which functions as a premise,
> FC=final conclusion 

email June, 2004

In difficult, novel situations with myriad, incomplete, and conflicting data, it is hard to construe meaning in order to act effectively. [...] Improving sensemaking will have direct and profound impact on a broad range of military and civilian applications, such as response to novel events and strategic planning. 


Complex, ill-structured, situation domains span such areas as command and control, business planning, new-product design, process reengineering, information systems development, etc. However, in all cases, the growing importance of group sensemaking, i.e., the elicitation and construction of group knowledge relevant to an emerging situation, is becoming clear -- those that do a better job of it will have a better chance of survival and increased competitive advantage. 

Participants engaged in group knowledge elicitation and construction in these ill-structured domains, whether distributed or not, face the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations about an emerging situation [Nosek, 2001]. They are not certain about what questions to ask, and if questions are posed, no clear answer is forthcoming [Daft and Lengel, 1986]. They grope through a recursive, discontinuous process of many difficult steps subjected to interference, feedback loops, and dead ends that more closely resembles fermentation than an assembly line [Mintzberg et al, 1976]. The participants' experience-based intuitive understanding may depend on insufficient or no-longer-relevant experience [Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986]. 


Shared mental models have the problem of knowledge or truth maintenance in that the information that was true for yesterday (or even an hour ago) may have decayed, have subtle changes, or may have demonstrably changed. These changes occurring over the entire decision space can play havoc with meaning, interpretations, and choice of actions, and highlight the need for conflict resolution, multi-source sensemaking, and the social construction of knowledge [Nosek & McNeese, 1997]. 

Augmenting Sensemaking Conversations
John T. Nosek
Temple University 2002


An Argument is a statement or opinion which either supports or objects to one or more Ideas. Arguments are the place -- indeed, the only place -- in the IBIS method for opinion, clever rhetoric, and hand waving. Of course, it is preferable to have Arguments which provide factual assertions bearing on the advantages or disadvantages of an Idea. The IBIS method considerably raises the quality of dialogue within a group or project team simply by concentrating opinions into Argument nodes. For example, the old trick of "truth by repetition" -- saying one's point over and over until everyone else accedes -- is disarmed, because once an Argument has been posted it becomes silly and obvious to repeat its contents. Arguments are linked to their Ideas with links (see Figure 4) [not reproduced here - bdt] called "supports" (for pros) and "objects to" (for cons). 

The response to a Question is one or more Ideas which provide a brief, neutral proposal for resolution of the Question. Ideas are linked to their Questions with "responds to" links. Ideas present a challenge to new users because of the great tendency, described above as the Answer Reflex, to bundle the justification for the Idea into the proposal itself. 

"The IBIS Manual" from Touchstone Resources Whitepapers

Reducing cognitive load of maintaining many Web search results
According to the information processing theory, human memory consists of three units: sensory memory, working memory, and long-term memory. The sensory memory, which is connected to the working memory, accepts auditory and visual information. The working memory, which is connected to both the sensory memory and the long-term memory, first fetches the auditory and/or visual information stored in the sensory memory, makes sense of it, and permanently stores the processed results into the long-term memory. Although human working memory is very efficient, it has been proved that ordinary people have only about 7 chunks of working memory (Stuart et al. 1983; Gagne´ & Glaser 1987). 

Thus, it is important to use effectively limited human working memory in order to achieve best learning performance, and it can explain why conventional Web search environments are not suitable for advanced Web-based learning activities, such as inquiry learning, which often involves iterative Web searches. As discussed earlier, people are often required to maintain many Web search results, each of which presumably takes up each chunk of their working memory, to further use what they have previously found. Thus, their Web search efficiency would rapidly decrease when their working memory is exhausted. The VisSearch environment employs a concept-mapping-based visualization technique to address this problem. With the VisSearch environment, people create a single concept map of the problem for which they want to find useful Web-based information, instead of conducting a series of separate Web searches. 

Concept Mapping Your Web searches: a design rationale and Web-enabled application
Y.-J. Lee
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
2004 Journal of Computer Assisted Learning 20, pp103 - 113
file:///c:/documents/discourse /concept_mapping_web_searches.pdf 


Sensemaking relates to Natural Decision Making (NDM) in that the focus is on understanding the situation. While NDM deals more in recognizing similarities with current and past situations rather than constructing a new understanding from incomplete, conflicting data, NDM describes how decision-makers under stress, like firefighters and jet fighter pilots, focus on understanding the situation. From this understanding, a reasonable alternative falls out that they execute. The emphasis is not on optimizing alternatives, nor deciding, it is on understanding the situation and performing an appropriate action that ensues. 


Knowledge management involves both the elicitation/construction of knowledge and the subsequent retrieval of meaningful knowledge in future situations. Group knowledge that is elicited and constructed must be stored in a manner that it can be accessed in meaningful ways. Organizational memories may need to support time spans from seconds to years. Organizational memory is needed for current situations where short term organizational memory losses can hinder real time sensemaking to future situations where participants may need to understand past actions or reuse organizational memories to speed up sensemaking. 

Knowledge management techniques, such as data-mining, must "divine" the meaning from the artifacts that are constructed. Standard knowledge management techniques have limited success in very well understood domains, in ill-structured domain situations, they are even less useful. This strong, cyclical relationship between the elicitation/construction of group knowledge and the storage/retrieval of relevant organizational memories in the future demands a better understanding of how to support group knowledge elicitation and construction. 

A Collaboration Envelope (such as SenseMaker) provides support for both the construction of knowledge and the greater potential for reuse. 


For example, in planning, one may want to revise an earlier plan or reuse a plan from another situation to the current situation. In both cases, planning revision or reuse, working from the plan without the rationale for the constituent parts of plan, is less than optimal and many times fruitless. However, if the rationale is accessible, such as the assumptions used in the construction of the plan, groups have demonstrated that they can successfully discuss and construct some degree of meaning of the differences in assumptions and therefore more effectively revise or reuse plans. 

Augmenting Sensemaking Conversations
John T. Nosek
Temple University 2002


Deliberation is a form of thinking in which we decide where we stand on some claim in light of the relevant arguments. It is common and important, whether in our personal, public or working lives. It is also complicated, difficult and usually poorly done. 

What is Deliberation? Deliberation, as the term is used here, is a process aimed at deciding whether some claim ought to be believed by considering the relevant arguments. The claim might describe what one should do (i.e., be of the form I/we should do X) and so deliberation can be directed towards action as well as belief. The arguments considered will invoke further claims, and in some cases their truth must also be determined through deliberation; and so on. Thus deliberation often involves considering an extended hierarchy of arguments. 

Deliberation is not the same as reasoning. Reasoning is tracing the web of inferential relationships among propositions; this can be done without intending to determine whether any particular proposition is true. For example, from All As are Bs and All Bs are Cs you can infer All As are Cs without caring whether any of these are true or even what they mean. This is reasoning but not deliberating. Deliberation obviously involves reasoning, however; indeed, reasoning is the means by which one deliberates. If reasoning is like running, then deliberation is like running to catch a bus or to win a race. 

Deliberation also differs subtly from argumentation. The latter is defined by van Eemeren et al. as "a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge. (van Eemeren et al., 1996 p.5)" and on this account, at least, involves rational persuasion: the point of argumentation is to influence others' attitudes by means of arguments. Deliberation, by contrast, is aimed at determining one's own attitude. 

Deliberation is often, like argumentation, a collective activity. For example a group of friends may deliberate over which restaurant is best, or a group of historians may deliberate to determine whether the treatment of indigenous Australians by European settlers merits the term "genocide". These forms of deliberation essentially involve both reasoning and argumentation. 

As Webster's defines it, to deliberate is "to weigh in the mind; to consider the reasons for and against; to consider maturely; to reflect upon; to ponder; as, to deliberate a question." (Webster & Porter, 1913) 

Enhancing Deliberation Through Computer Supported Argument Mapping
Tim van Gelder
Department of Philosophy
University of Melbourne, Australia and Austhink


"The navigation decision-whether or not to click-hinges on the mental image users create of the page they expect to see. [...] 

The most important factor in evaluating the link is its language. First and foremost, users will look for specific words that they would use to describe what theyíre looking for. They arenít mulling over interpretation and connotation. Theyíre looking for particular words, and finding those particular words will overwhelmingly cause them to click links. If they donít see their own words, theyíll keep an eye out for words they would expect other people to use. A synonym will do just fine, but it wonít generate the level of interest that an exact match will. 

Even if the link text is not an exact match or a synonym, users will still take note if it is in the same conceptual neighborhood as their target. Mentally flagging links that might be related to what they are seeking can help them in two ways. In some contexts, it can reassure them that theyíre on the right track, keeping them looking for a closer match. In other cases, if the closer match doesnít turn up, that close-but-not-quite link may turn out to be their best bet, bringing them back to click." 

The Psychology of Navigation
Jesse James Garrett
http://www.digital-web.com/features /feature_2002-12b.shtml

What is Argument Mapping? An argument map is a presentation of reasoning in which the evidential relationships among claims are made wholly explicit using graphical or other non-verbal techniques. Argument mapping is producing such maps. 


The point of argument mapping is to present complex reasoning in a clear and unambiguous way, and mappers should use whatever resources work best
in achieving this goal. Currently, argument maps are mostly "box and arrow" diagrams like the one above, but it may turn out that some different approach will work more effectively. For example, somebody may develop a clever way to present arguments in virtual 3D, or even in immersive "virtual reality" fly-through environments. As long as the presentation makes the structure of reasoning completely explicit and unambiguous, it will count as argument mapping. 

Argument Mapping Versus Prose Although prose is the standard way to present reasoning, it is not a good tool for the job. Extracting the structure of evidential relationships from reasoning as typically presented in prose is very difficult and most of the time we do it badly. This can be easily illustrated, in a kind of exercise we have done informally many times in workshops. Take any group of people sufficiently trained in reasoning and argument mapping that they are quite able to create argument maps to make explicit whatever reasoning they have in mind. Now give them a sample of good argumentative prose, such as a well-argued opinion piece from the newspaper. Ask them to figure out what the reasoning is, and to re-present it in an argument map. This usually takes about 20- 30 minutes, during which time you can enjoy watching the participants strike various Rodinesque postures of intense concentration, wipe their sweaty palms, etc.. Then compare the resulting argument maps. You'll find that you have as many different argument maps as there are people doing the exercise; in many cases the argument Enhancing Deliberation Through Computer Supported Argument Visualization maps will be wildly different. This shows that the opinion piece failed to reliably convey the author's argument, whatever it was. 

Argument maps are deliberately designed to overcome precisely this problem with prose. Exercises similar to the one just described show that they fulfil their intended role. Take any group of people sufficiently trained to be able to be read argument maps. (This training usually takes not more than a few minutes.) Present them with an argument map, and ask them to identify the reasoning presented in the map, and represent it in whatever form they like (map, prose, point-form etc.). This is a very simple task and usually takes almost no time; indeed, it is so trivial that the hard part is getting the participants to go through the motions when no intellectual challenge is involved. Ask them questions designed to elicit the extent to which they have correctly identified the structure of the reasoning presented by the map (e.g., how many distinct reasons are presented for the main conclusion?). You'll find that they all understand exactly what the reasoning is, and ipso facto all have the same sense of the reasoning. 

In short, a task - identify the presented reasoning - which was difficult, timeconsuming and almost always fails in the standard prose format is easy, fast and almost completely reliable in the argument mapping format. The point here is really quite simple, although it often meets resistance. Representations deliberately designed to communicate reasoning easily, rapidly and reliably can achieve this goal. 

Enhancing Deliberation Through Computer Supported Argument Mapping
Tim van Gelder
Department of Philosophy
University of Melbourne, Australia and Austhink


"Zuboff describes the implementation of a computer conferencing system at a pharmaceutical company. This system evolved from its original and
intended role as a research support tool, to new social milieu with substantial informal participation, and finally to a perceived threat by management: 

The social exchanges that surround professional work help constitute an oral culture; they vanish without a trace when the coffee break is over, when a group rises from the lunch table, when people part in the hallway, when the telephone receiver is replaced on its hook, when the meeting room empties. Computer conferencing transformed this transient talk into a concrete presence. It was as if the ether of sociality that once filled the hallways had suddenly congealed. Now there were printouts that could be touched, carried about, and carefully examined. Through participation in DIALOG [a corporate text-based conferencing system], a great deal of the sociality that infuses professional exchanged was committed to text and so made concrete and visible in a wholly new way. (p. 376) 


Meyerowitz (1985), although he touches only briefly upon CMC toward the end of his book, is one of the first authors to directly address these points. Saying "The effects of the computer on group identity, socialization, and hierarchy are not unidirectional" (p. 323), he examines the ways in which information systems can be influenced by their users, as well as the effects upon the users. In the following passage, he clearly rejects the more deterministic model of CMC put forth by other researchers: 

Individuals behaving in physical or mediated environments still have a wide range of behavioral choices within the overall constraints. . . . On a group level, the situation is even less deterministic. For we design and use our rooms, buildings, media, rituals, and other social environments. We can redesign them, abandon them, or alter their use. Ultimately, then, the most deterministic perspective may be unwittingly embraced by those who refuse to apply our greatest freedom--human reason and analysis-- to the social factors that influence behavior. We do not retain free-choice simply because we refuse to see and study those things that constrain our actions. Indeed, we often give up the potential of additional freedom to control our lives by choosing not to see how the environments we shape can, in turn, work to reshape us." (p. 329) 


Haraway (1991) also addresses the issue of technological determinism, focusing on the importance of communication, and the role of technology in facilitating that communication. She suggests the potential use of political and social theory to both analyze and influence the role of technology in determining power structures: 

I used the odd circumlocution, `the social relations of science and technology', to indicate that we are not dealing with a technological determinism, but with a historical system depending upon structured relations among people. But the phrase should also indicate that science and technology provide fresh sources of power, that we need fresh sources of analysis and political action (Latour, 1984). Some of the rearrangements of race, sex, and class rooted in high-tech-facilitated social relations can make socialist-feminism more relevant to effective progressive politics. (p. 165) 


These "fresh sources of analysis and political action" may well come from Habermas and his contemporaries, who have built models of communication that they believe can foster the development of a rational--and consequently just--society. 

In his recent works, Habermas has proposed a model of communicative action--defined as action aimed at reaching understanding (Habermas, 1979)--that presumes four "validity claims" have been met: comprehensibility, sincere intent, true content, and normative correctness (appropriateness). When these claims are challenged, an "ideal speech situation" that encourages discourse ensues. When claims are not challenged, ideology--defined as unexamined assumptions--ensues. A critical aspect of the ideal speech situation, as defined by Habermas, is that participants be fully open about intentions, motives, including attitudes, feelings, and needs. In addition, there must be freedom to challenge any of the four validity claims (White, 1988). The potential for discourse (as defined by Habermas) in the environment of CMC is excellent; however, as is noted later in this paper, this potential is often threatened by technocratic ideologues. 

Specifically, White (1988) defines Habermas ideal speech situation as meeting the following criteria: 1) "Each subject who is capable of speech and action is allowed to participate in discourses." 2) a) "Each is allowed to call into question any proposal." b) "Each is allowed to introduce any proposal into the discourse." c) "Each is allowed to express his attitudes, wishes, and needs." 3) "No speaker ought to be hindered by compulsion--whether arising from inside the discourse or outside of it--from making use of the rights secured under [1 and 2]." 


Although there appears to be a belief among the users of CMC systems that the medium lends itself to democratization of the communication process[4], and a nearly ideal speech situation, this perception may not be entirely reliable. Current CMC systems tend to be used by a technically sophisticated elite, and are often not representative of the geographic or even intellectual community in which they exist (Myers, 1987; Rogers, 1992). In addition, there are both obvious and subtle controls over the interaction that can have a substantial effect upon the quality of discourse and the level of communicative distortion. In order to effectively identify and understand those controlling factors, it is useful to turn to other areas of social study in which critical theory has been successfully applied.

Discourse and Distortion in Computer-Mediated Communication Elizabeth Lane Lawley


"An argument is like an organism. It has both a gross anatomical structure and a finer, as it were physiological one. When set out explicitly in full detail, it may be large and time consuming. Within the delivery time and space, one can distinguish the main phases marking the progress of the argument from initial statement of unsettled problem to final presentation of a conclusion" 

Toulmin, S. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
quoted in Identity, Control and Changing Reality
Cathy Gunn
Education Technology Program Leader
CPD University of Auckland, NEW ZEALAND

Supporting the Reading of Research in Online Settings John Willinsky 

[opening paragraph] "A good deal of the emerging research literature concerned with online
information resources focuses on information retrieval, which is concerned with user strategies with search engines to locate desired information. This study takes up the question of what happens once readers find what they imagine they have been looking for when the subject of their search has been the research literature. It will investigate how journal websites can be designed to better support the reading of research in online settings for a wider range of readers than has traditionally been the case with research. Given that well over 75 percent of research journals now publish online, with a number of them made free to read, the reading experience and audience for research is changing. This study will look at whether the design and structure of the journalís "information environment" can improve the reading experience of expert and novice readers of this literature. It will look specifically at whether providing far richer context of related background materials for a given text than is available with print, assists the online reading process." 

Detailed Description - Research Objectives "[... T]he publication of research online has opened the door on a wider readership of research made up of professionals, such as teachers and physicians, as well policymakers and interested members of the public. In interesting ways, the scholarly publishing environment has become an excellent place to test new ideas about reading and literacy, while holding the potential for supporting increasing public presence of this form of knowledge. 

The Web has certainly become home for a great deal of university research, as the turn of the century saw 75 percent of scholarly journals turn to online editions, and roughly 1,000 journals publishing online alone (Tenpoir & King, 2000). As well, more of this online research is being made available to a wider public, through eprint archives and open access indexes like PubMed. A number of leading journals make their current or recent contents freely available online, from the New England Journal of Medicine and British Medical Journal to the Educational Researcher and Teachers College Record. Research is being made available online not only for faculty and students, but in many cases, for a wider public, as well as for those working in universities who have previously had little access to the research literature. It has already proven itself to be a particularly valuable source of information for people in the area of health, for example, as well as an indispensable research tool for students and teachers." 

"The Context of Study [...] The philosophical and political implications of improving access to the research literature have also been explored in additional works (Willinsky, 1999; 2000; 2002). This study focuses in on improving current online journal designs which already link articles to databases of related articles and references to the source texts. Studies have shown that experienced journal readers use hyperlinking features to check references and contact authors, but these same users have also expressed a desire for improved e-journal designs, with access to deeper archival resources, as well as greater clarity on what is available to readers and an ability to move across different information "landscapes" (Tenopir, 2003, p. 21)." 

"The Potential Public Readership of Research In 1999, the estimates were that 52 million Americans, or somewhat half of those who went online, had looked for health information online (Deloitte Research, 1999). The Pew Internet and American Life Project calls the online access to medical information and research an "online health revolution," which is helping "Americans take better care of themselves" (Fox & Rainee, 2000). This "new method of care" is being called by doctors, "shared decision making" (Brownlee, 2003, p. 54). Shared decision making sounds a lot like democracy in action, whether one thinks of a nation, a doctorís office, or a community school. It is a form of sharing that an increase in public access to medical research has made possible. Studies estimate that six million Americans go online each day in search of information about health and disease (NIH, 2003). The fact that only a portion of that information is informed by research speaks to the importance of supporting peopleís ability to identify and utilize peer-reviewed research. People need that support, as doctors have begun to experiment with "health information prescriptions" that guide patients to reliable sources, including the National Library of Medicine, which includes the latest medical research (ibid.). In addition to this emerging public interest in health research, many professionals, including teachers and health care providers are being asked to adhere to "best practices," "evidence-based" procedures, and "knowledge translation," all of which have also led to a growing emphasis on professional and public access to research resources (Willinsky, 2001; Willinsky, 2003; Davis et al., 2003). While researchers and their students will undoubtedly remain the primary readers of research -- and thus form a primary focus of this study -- this new class of readers of research not only presents an opportunity to explore the literacy development of non-expert readers, but to assist in extending the reach of public education in a way that honors peopleís right to know what is known." 

"Methodology - Information Environment: Each online journal article will be accompanied by a Research Support Tool (RST) which will house the additional resources intended to support the reader. The RST is designed to provide readers with access to (a) background materials on the article, such as author biography, sponsor of research, keywords, peerreview status, (b) context resources, including both academic and non-academic sources made up of related studies, others by the authors, media, government policy, and instructional databases and (c) interactive applets for commenting, contacting the author, contacting others and creating a portfolio. The appropriate contextual resources provided for each article will be distinguished by the design of a RST for each discipline area, as ERIC provides an excellent and free resource for finding related studies in education, while PubMed provides a similar service in the life sciences. The actual studies called up for the reader to consider, if they so request them, will be searched for and found in these databases automatically by utilizing the keywords provided by the author of the article, or they can be changed by the reader, given an interest in a particular aspect. The RST uses open access or free databases, so that readers do not need to belong to a research library in order to use the tool. Each article presented to the readers will also have its references linked to the full texts or abstracts if they are available online. The iterative method of this study will provide opportunities to refine and improve on the design of the RST through the three phases. The RST is designed, then, to be discipline or multi-discipline specific, and to appear with each article published in the journal, while not adding to editorial labor or costs, nor to author requirements (apart from providing keywords on submitting the article for publication)." 

Supporting the Reading of Research in Online Settings
John Willinsky
file:///C|/Documents/argumaps/pkp /pkp-reading_research_online.pdf 


"They launch the law onto a sea of hypothetical uncertainties. The causes of things are usually concealed from casual inspection. Finding them out is what science is for, and it is not surprising that it took 4500 years of human history for science to find its feet and really begin to discover the inner workings of nature. It is still a process, as Karl Popper puts it, of "conjectures" and "refutations." That is what a scientific theory is: a conjecture. Some theories, at this point, seem to be things that we can trust in with some confidence; but it is much clearer now than it was fifty years ago that science is not just a simple march from ignorance to certainty. Indeed, the insights of Popper and Thomas Kuhn are that every scientific "conjecture" inevitably contains preconceptions and prejudices that are not easily weeded from the theory. That is unavoidable. But where Bacon had wanted to say that all prejudices are bad as such and must be avoided, we can say now that, not only cannot they be avoided, but that even the lamest prejudice sometimes actually turns out to be true. In light of this, however confident or distrustful we may be of science, it is in any case a weak reed upon which to begin manipulating, punishing, exhorting, and coercing people because of theories about the causes of criminal behavior. The way that science gets used in such projects is almost always shallow and credulous in the extreme: if scientific theories or results support some political agenda, then they are simply True; but if they begin to contradict it, then suddenly science contains all these vicious prejudices and preconceptions (!) and perhaps is even
wholly unreliable and discreditable because of some underlying agenda. The most amazing move is when scientific truth is seen as inherently a matter of power politics, for that leaves knowledge of causes in general as a pawn of power and political ideology--which means we can just believe whatever we want to, given our own particular grievances with things, and then call it our "science." The tough bullet to bite is that all such triumphant or recriminating uses of science are irrelevant if the causes of behavior, apart from out and out insanity, are simply irrelevant to the law." 

Rights, Responsibilities, and Communitarianism

Enhancing Deliberation via Argument Mapping
[... W]e deliberate better when we use argument mapping to lay out reasoning, as compared with standard or traditional practice, which is to use prose. To deliberate better is, in the end, to make better judgements as to what is true and what is false. Such judgements can be better in two ways. First, they can be better-founded; more systematic, more balanced, more objective. Second, they can be more correct; they can better reflect the truth of the matter. Presumably if they are better in the first sense they will be better in the second. 

Argument Mapping in Critical Thinking Training Deliberation is usually done quite poorly. An impressive piece of evidence in this regard is the study reported by psychologist Deanna Kuhn in her book The Skills of Argument (Kuhn, 1991). Kuhn and her team intensively interviewed hundreds of people, sampling from many age groups, occupations, educational backgrounds, etc., with a view to gauging their basic reasoning and argument skills. As I interpret the huge amount of data she presents, she found that over half of the population simply cannot reliably exhibit the basic skills needed in order to successfully deliberate over important issues of any complexity. For example, she found that while most people readily hold an opinion on an issue such as why many criminals repeat their crimes, over half, when asked for evidence to support that opinion, could not provide any at all. They would of course say a lot of stuff in response to the request for evidence; the trouble is that what they said wasn't evidence (let alone good evidence). 


[In the research project}, how did computer supported argument mapping enhance group deliberation?

  1. Most profoundly, the live argument-mapping process expanded participants' sense of the full set of arguments, and where individual arguments belonged in the overall structure. They could, literally, see what was going on, in a way not possible with standard prose-based ways of Enhancing Deliberation Through Computer Supported Argument Visualization handling reasoning; and, having seen the full argument, were better able to take relevant factors into account. 
  2. The evolving, projected argument map gave participants a common understanding of the arguments and their structure. In ordinary argumentative practices, people must maintain in their minds a sense of what the overall argument is. Since this is exceedingly difficult to do, they end up with partial versions and everyone has a somewhat different interpretation. When everyone is on a different wavelength, there is a great deal of confusion, needless disputation, and wasted time. 
  3. The argument mapping process gave participants a powerful sense that they had been heard, that their opinion had been registered. When they made a contribution to the overall debate, it was entered in a box and placed on the tree, and it stayed there for all to see for the duration of the workshop; and if it had not been responded to, this was immediately apparent in the visual layout of the argument tree. 
  4. The argument mapping process smoothed the path to rational consensus by depersonalising disagreement. In standard meetings or round-table discussions, positions tend to be identified with people, and debate becomes a personal contest as much as an objective considering of the arguments. When all attention is focused on the argument tree, however, personalities drop away and people are much better able to appreciate the force of the arguments, and to see gaps and weaknesses.
  5. The poster-sized argument map is now a permanent part of that particular organisation's memory. On one day, the participants had achieved what was probably their highest-ever level of awareness and understanding of the arguments on a topic of considerable internal importance. If they were to rely unaided memory to store this "knowledge," or even had it written up and filed away in some kind of report, it would surely have been lost. The argument map both encodes that knowledge and makes it readily recoverable for anyone in future.
Deliberation is the primary means by which we strive for, and sometimes actually find, the truth on important, complex issues. Anything which enhances deliberation thereby enhances our ability to know the truth. Argument mapping can substantially enhance deliberation, relative to traditional practices. The emergence of new, dedicated argument-mapping support tools will, I believe, enable argument mapping to become widespread practice in schools, and in the workplace, in domains as various as policy making, research, politics, the law, and dispute resolution. If all this is correct, computer supported argument mapping ought, in the long run, contribute substantially to human well-being. In this sense, our project is a extension of the Enlightenment vision of progress through the refinement and application of Reason. 

Enhancing Deliberation Through Computer Supported Argument Mapping
Tim van Gelder
Department of Philosophy
University of Melbourne, Australia and Austhink


Argumentation Mapping
Karl Popper, the century's great philosopher of science, suggested that science and philosophy, indeed, all of human thinking-progresses from conjecture to refutation, that is, from claim to rebuttal to counterrebuttal or new claim. In the combat of ideas, some survive and others fall. But the clash of ideas always results in new thinking, in new distinctions, new concepts, new frameworks, new ways of viewing the world. 

Argumentation has always been crucial to the development of ideas from Socrates in the Athenian marketplace through the debates of the new universities of the Middle Ages to the 20th Century's proliferating scientific journals. Today, however, the increasing complexity of information and specialization has relegated most scientific and philosophical argument into the seminar rooms of the academy. Debates are still carried on worldwide by hundreds of participants in different disciplines, but who often don't read each other's literature. Complexity/specialization is not only the dilemma of the modern student, however, it is a misfortune for any reader who hopes to stay informed of humanity's greatest questions. Nowadays it is almost impossible to answer the question: What is the current status of any one of these great debates? What arguments have been answered and rebutted? What points still stand at the moment? Traditionally textbooks were expected to answer such questions, but they have become simultaneously bloated and selective as well. Interdisciplinary studies are supposed to solve many of these problems, but they usually fall victim to departmental struggles over students, budgets, publications, and promotions 

The modern study of argumentation began in 1957 with the philosopher Stephen Toulmin's recognition that most real-life arguments did not resemble formal argumentation schemes in place since Aristotle. Toulmin, a student of Wittgenstein, showed how much of modern philosophy, especially that associated with formal logic and the so-called analytic schools, had become a technical study drifting apart from the way thinking was actually done in many other fields-scientific, technological, legal, medical, and practical. 


[T]he classroom of the future will have extraordinary capabilities for providing both the big picture and the ability, through hypertext linkages, to drill down to the level of minute detail. The argumentation mapping structure will provide one of the overall orienting foundations. Furthermore, the methodology is transferable to a wide variety of other fields suffering from complexity and information overload. 

It has become obvious that Horn's new mapping methodology could meet a demand that has existed for decades-students' struggle to understand the structure and context of important academic debates and the professorial problem of presenting the big picture of major controversies while at the same time remaining faithful to detailed points of difference. 

Background Paper
Mapping Great Debates

Coherence in Hypertext 

What is coherence? Or rather, what kind of coherence concept is the most appropriate to apply in a hypertextual context? 

In one branch of text linguistics, coherence is understood as the total of the mechanisms which make a text a logical unit. Coherence corresponds, then, to the system of explicit and implicit connective elements of the text, and is regarded as a text-immanent entity. In this perspective, it will hardly be possible for a text which invites different, individual reading strategies to have as strong coherence as a text with a fixed, linear structure. 

According to a more cognitively oriented branch of text linguistics, coherence is a result of mental work and is consequently tied to the reading process rather than to the text itself. The reader assigns coherence to the text, or, as van Dijk (1988:62) says: "empirically speaking, discourse does not have coherence, but is assigned coherence by language users. 

Whether the reader assigns coherence to the text or not is determined by whether he/she feels that the units of meaning activated by the text are mutually relevant within the text's universe of meaning. Beaugrande & Dressler (1996:84) state: "A text "makes sense" because there is a CONTINUITY OF SENSES among the knowledge activated by the expressions of the text. We would define this continuity of senses as the foundation of COHERENCE, being the mutual access and relevance within a configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS." (Capitalized by the author.) 

In Sperber and Wilson's (1986) relevance theory the issue of coherence is even more closely connected to the inner activity of the participants
in the communication process (note 4). When reading a text, or in other ways participating in communicative acts, one is, according to this theory, constantly searching for relevance, which includes a logical relation between the unit of meaning activated at the moment and those activated earlier in the discourse (note 5). (For a more thorough treatment of relevant coherence theory, see Leraand 1998.) 


"From a linguistic point of view, it may be argued that hypertext represents a potential extension of the language system as we know it from the media of speech and writing. In these two media, language is realised through a process of selection and chaining : sounds/letters are chained to form words, words are chained to form sentences, and sentences are chained to form texts. Hypertext introduces a linguistic level above the text level: texts may be combined into hypertexts. And this combination need not - as on the other levels - have the characteristics of chaining

Other, new combinatory principles may be employed to interconnect text elements. Thus, other linguistic structural principles than the principle of linearity may be developed, also on the surface level of the text. (On the semantic-hermeneutic level, linearity has never been dominant in the same way.) 

Hypertexts have, then, firstly a text level - where the rules for combining and chaining are largely identical with the rules for paper-based writing - and secondly, a hypertext level where completely different rules apply (although exactly which is still unclear). 

The relationship between these two linguistic levels represents a potential for new types of linguistic dynamics; the text units provide each other with meaning-creating contexts by the way they are structured and interconnected. 

To point out two fundamental aspects of hypertextual functionality, the following definition may be used as an open, pragmatic, technology-oriented version: 

Hypertext is a concept for organising and accessing information, based on a technology which offers the possibility of interconnecting text elements by means of electronic links. The elements can be independent documents (nodes) or different sequences of one and the same document. The concept may also be used non-generically ("a hypertext"), about a specific group of text elements interconnected as described above.
The central element in the above definition (based on Nelson, T. H. (1993 [1981]): Literary Machines and McKnight, C., Dillon, A. and Richardson, J. (1991) Hypertext in Context, among others) is that hypertext can provide both organisational and presentational structure to a given text material (for instance, news material) and access to information (for instance, related news articles) - in both
cases by means of electronic linking. 

It should be noted, however, that what is usually regarded as the main feature of hypertext, namely the electronic link, is not necessarily represented as a visible mark in the text surface. Certain hypertext systems let the reader navigate by means of a graphical representation of the entire node system, a type of "map". This kind of spatial hypertext system utilizes the spatial dimensions of the screen to signal textual relations, semantic or pragmatic. To access the nodes, readers click directly on a selected area of the map instead of clicking on a link in the text itself. 

(Figure 4 is an example of a hypertext without explicit links between the nodes. The nodes are interconnected through the interface of the map.) 

In current electronic newspapers, the second function mentioned in the definition - hypertext providing access to information - is tentatively utilized. Links are established between today's article and other relevant articles or Web sites. Primarily, this means that the article content is connected to the paper?s own news archive. However, this type of hyperlinkage does not affect the form of the individual news articles. Articles in electronic newspapers are by and large identical to news articles in the printed press; they are usually collected directly from an article database shared with a paper-based newspaper. 

The second function, hypertext as structure , has so far been very little used. However, this function has the largest potential of change in terms of forms and functions of news on the Web. 

3.1 Hypertext as structure Hypertext does not imply organisational chaos, but offers an opportunity of establishing a new type of linguistic order. The hypertext designer will have to select the text elements to be interconnected by electronic links. Normally, this selection will also involve choosing a global structure for the system of nodes and links. It is this system that will determine how the text material can be read. 

Mainly two categories contribute to polarising the wide range of structural possibilities, namely the axial - or hierarchical - structure and the network structure (Figure 1. Structure: two fundamental types of hyperstructure, axial - or hierarchical - structure (left) and network structure) 

The axial structure has a "trunk" consisting of a simple "main node" or a sequence of central nodes indicating a recommended reading strategy. This trunk may have varying numbers of "branches" with additional information which readers may choose to click on. 

The network structure is basically characterized by the absence of such a centring "trunk", or any other device dedicated to ordering the nodes (see Bertin, Jacques (1981) Graphics and graphic information-processing). The nodes are linked together criss-cross on the basis of semantic criteria - or other criteria which the hypertext designer might want to apply. It hardly serves any purpose to maintain
that hypertext structures must be either axial or networked, as suggested by some hypertext theorists (cf. Landow, G. P. (1994) "What?s a Critic to Do? Critical Theory in the Age of Hypertext". In "Hyper/Text/Theory" edited by G. P. Landow (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press) ). A hypertext with an apparent hierarchical structure may well have a link system that at the same time gives the text a network structure. We might say that different hypertexts can have varying degrees of openness in their structure, but one of the two principles will usually dominate the individual hypertext presentation." 

"When discussing theoretical issues relating to hypertext, it is usually an advantage to base the discussion on a particular type of application (adapted genre), and preferably on concrete models. [...] The original presentations may be viewed at http://home.hia.no/~martine/proto.htm)"" [enter my GNodal mapping prototype] 

"The summary is relatively brief, with a continuous presentation of the main elements of the material. All instances of concretisation, exemplification, elaboration, discussion, etc., have been removed and organised in separate text nodes. These nodes are connected to the main text by means of hyperlinks, and the links are anchored at those points in the main text where the node theme is of interest." 

"[H]ypernews should not be regarded as a final replacement of the news story, but rather as an alternative. Bostad (1998:290) states: "Writing with a hypertext writing tool is a way of structuring and categorizing the 'surrounding world'". Generally, one might say that hypernews is best suited for mediation of complex news events consisting of a large number of elements and relations: election campaigns, catastrophes, big court cases, etc. " 

[Discourse!! - bdt] 

4. Coherence in hypertext What is coherence? Or rather, what kind of coherence concept is the most appropriate to apply in a hypertextual context? 

In one branch of text linguistics, coherence is understood as the total of the mechanisms which make a text a logical unit . Coherence corresponds, then, to the system of explicit and implicit connective elements of the text, and is regarded as a text-immanent entity. In this perspective, it will hardly be possible for a text which invites different, individual reading strategies to have as strong coherence as a text with a fixed, linear structure. 

According to a more cognitively oriented branch of text linguistics, coherence is a result of mental work and is consequently tied to the reading process rather than to the text itself. The reader assigns coherence to the text, or, as van Dijk, T.A (1988:62) News as Discourse says: 

? empirically speaking, discourse does not have coherence, but is coherence by language users.
Whether the reader assigns coherence to the text or not is determined by whether he/she feels that the units of meaning activated by the text are mutually
relevant within the text's universe of meaning. Beaugrande, R.A. and Dressler, W.U.(1996 [1981]) Introduction to Text Linguistics state: 
A text "makes sense" because there is a CONTINUITY OF SENSES among the knowledge activated by the expressions of the text? We would define this continuity of senses as the foundation of COHERENCE, being the mutual access and relevance within a configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS. (Capitalized by the author.)
In Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986) Relevance. Communication and Cognition relevance theory the issue of coherence is even more closely connected to the inner activity of the participants in the communication process (note 4). When reading a text, or in other ways participating in communicative acts, one is, according to this theory, constantly searching for relevance , which includes a logical relation between the unit of meaning activated at the moment and those activated earlier in the discourse (note 5). (For a more thorough treatment of relevant coherence theory, see Leraand, Glenn (1998) Tekstlingvistiske perspektiver på hypertekst.) 

4.3 Three levels of coherence in hypertext To describe the text-immanent apparatus which might contribute to strengthening coherence in hypertext reading, it might be useful to outline a three-level model. These levels are not primarily motivated by the textlinguistic division into cohesion, local coherence and global coherence, but by the linguistic levels of hypertexts. In our model, we distinguish between three types of coherence: 1.intranodal coherence 2.internodal coherence 3.hyperstructural coherence 

Intranodal coherence is limited to the node level of the hypertext and comprises all types of coherence at this level. It follows that intranodal coherence corresponds to the traditional textlinguistic notion of coherence, and the reader's expectations with respect to relatedness at this level presumably correspond to the expectations of a traditional, linear text. 

Internodal coherence denotes the relationship between two text nodes read in a sequence. Even though hypertexts usually have a non-linear structure, each separate reading will always be linear. This means that the reader will expect a type of "local coherence" between two nodes which are linked together or which the system otherwise allows to be read in a sequence. In this way, the link functions as an ostensive signal of mutual relevance. 

Hyperstructural coherence denotes the logic reflected through the structure that governs the whole system of links and nodes. This logic also defines the place of each node in the system as a whole. Consequently, hyperstructural coherence is related to the textlinguistic notion of "global coherence" 

Note 4 An interesting application of Sperber & Wilson's relevance theory on the discussion of hyperlinks is offered by Tosca, S.P. (2000) "A Pragmatics of Links". Journal of Digital Information, http://jodi.ecs.soton.ac.uk/Articles/v01/i06/Pajares/ 

Note 5 The theory of mental models - in the literature of psychology called maps (Tolman, E.C. (1948) "Cognitive maps in rats and men". Psychological Review, Vol. 55, 189-208 ), frames (Minsky, M. (1975) "A framework for representing knowledge". In The Psychology of Computer Vision), schemata (Rumelhart, D. E. (1976) "Understanding and summarizing brief stories". In Basic processes in reading: Perception and comprehension) scripts (Schank, R. and Abelson, R. (1977) Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures ) or models (Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1983) Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, influence, and consciousness) - is essential in the discussion of how human beings transform experience into knowledge and how this knowledge is activated during interaction with new objects, situations or texts. 

Hypernews and Coherence
Martin Engebretsen
Agder University College, Norway
E-mail: martin.engebretsen@hia.no
file:///C|/Documents/argumaps/gnodal docs/hypernews_coherence.html 


The foundation of Noosphere's authority model is that of the object owner. At it's simplest level, this system is what you might expect: the person who creates an object becomes its owner, and basically has complete control over what kind of changes are made to the object. They are the gatekeeper for all changes to the object, and their judgement is assumed to be reasonable. 

The motivation for this system was to appeal to the natural instinct of valuing and perfecting that which one has created, especially when this work is on display for a large community. When a single name is associated with a work, the quality of that work becomes a statement about its creator. Hence, the ownership model encourages quality work on sites running Noosphere. 

However, if this were the end of the story, such sites would be in pretty poor shape. The problem is that we can never assume that an object is ``complete,'' and experience shows us that this is a reasonable assumption. This fact clashes with the observation that people in any (online) community come and go, their attention waxes and wanes, available free time varies considerably, and interest can in some cases quickly fade. 

Not only may a user create an object and never return to maintain it, but it is simply too much to ask that a user maintain their contribution to the site in perpetuity. A solution is needed that strikes a compromise between singular ownership and community involvement in order to account for a shifting user base. 

The Adoption System One solution to this problem is to follow the Wiki model and simply allow anyone to modify objects, completely overturning the ownership model. Clearly this solution brings to an end the system of ``the owner,'' and incentives to at least attempt to take full responsibility for an entry are somewhat diminished. 

In addition, this model is somewhat inappropriate for mathematical and scientific content. Requring a correction to be filed in order to suggest changes creates a dialog around these proposed changes. This is good because there typically is a ``right'' answer in these fields, and it may not be obvious to the casual observer who might just happen by and think they see something wrong. 

Though the ability to roll back changes in Wiki can ``simulate'' the rejection of corrections in Noosphere, the dialog surrounding corrections is more appropriately formalize, preserved and packaged in Noosphere. For these reasons and others, it is widely believed that this is not a good authority model for sites developing mathematical or scientific content. 

The ACL System [...] What seems to be missing is the ability to make the decision to ``share'' responsibility for an entry between two or more people, effectively making the creator of an object a group-like entity. The singular owner system is nice as a starting point, but in the real world, multiple authors are common. 

This is somewhat different again from the Wiki model in that the author group still should be restricted. Thinking of the group of authors as a Noosphere ``user'' which acts as the owner of an object is a good approximation. 

This system has been implemented with ACLs, or Access Control Lists. The starting point for any new object is to have one owner who is ``superuser'' with regards to that object, but this person can, if they choose, use ACLs to define other users or groups of system users who should also have edit access to the object. 

The access rules in Noosphere are simple. A single rule specification consists of read, write, and ACL flags, and a subject (which can be a user or a group). Or, instead of a subject, the rule can be ``default'' in which case it is applied to users for whom no other matching rule can be found (the user isn't explicitly mentioned in a rule, or isn't in a group that is mentiond). The ``read'' and ``write'' flags are fairly self-explanatory. The ``ACL'' flag simply determines whether or not the subject can also define ACL rules for the object. Granting a subject ``ACL'' permission is akin to making this subjec an ``admin'' or ``editor'' (rather than author) of the object. 

These rules allow Noosphere to subsume the Wiki authority model where this is desired, since an owner can include a default access rule to make their objects world-writeable. But orphaning and adoption still applies as before, so this universal authoring status must be maintained by actual participation and upkeep. 

More importantly though is the added flexibility the ACL system affords the ownership model, generalizing the concept of ``owner'' to a group. It is anticipated that this will be commonly needed, as it is possible to begin an entry from one approach and with one facet of expertise, but later discover that there are many other facts to the concept which it would do better to have other ``experts'' write about. In this situation, changing ownership seems less reasonable than simply expanding the set of authors, to properly give all parties credit. 

Noosphere's Authority Model

The metaphor
We relied heavily on the metaphor of exploration and mapmaking during the research and production of the Can Computers Think? series. At the start, we thought a single map would suffice to chart the territory we were interested in. One map soon became two. Then four, then seven. The task we had set for ourselves grew more daunting as the boundaries of the territory grew. I kept reminding our team that, like the Lewis and Clark expedition, we could never know what was over the next hill. You cannot know the size of a continent until you reach the end of the landform. Our team experienced a similar sense of traveling through a "great unknown," which came from the existence of only a few good summaries of arguments in the field of artificial intelligence. 

First expedition - These maps are the result of our first expedition into the jungles of a major academic argument. They bear all of the excitement and all of the imperfections of any such first expedition. The explorers have returned older and wiser from what is now an almost six-year adventure. 

Like many explorers, we began our journey in familiar territory. Soon, we were into completely unknown (to us) areas of the debate. The difficulties of charting unknown territory was compounded by the fact that our team was making up the criteria and conventions for a new kind of cartography as we "traveled." Often, we had to stop and ask: How shall we present this? What kind of a map are we trying to make? At other times, we found ourselves wandering over land bridges into new continents-vast unmapped areas at the frontiers of the central debate about machine intelligence. Should we cross the boundary into the mind-body problem? Should we cross over into arguments about the nature of the mind? Should we develop a map of the argument about whether animals could think? 

Unmapped territory - A considerable number of arguments on the maps are imbedded in wider debates and discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and other disciplines. Such imbedding illustrates how most philosophical thinking is broadly connected and interdisciplinary. In order to create a manageable and readable map, we left out extensive mapping of many such "peripheral" debates. 

Mapping jungles - We discovered some pretty thick jungles of prose during our exploration. Each of our team members ran into them, often got bogged down in the swamps, and frankly we sometimes had to detour around impassable areas. This is by way of saying that there exists a considerable amount of academic prose that is impenetrable, even to the most indomitable mappers. We may have missed some good arguments, and our summaries of others may be plainly wrong. We hope that these are not too many. But he or she who grows a jungle is likely to have it mapped as such. 

The Cartographic Metaphor used in Mapping Great Debates

Bernard D. Tremblay wrote: 
> One characteristic that perhaps indicates how discourse produces a complex
> set of effects is this: a particular position arising out of its distinct
> context and from its distinct perspective carries with it insights and
> flaws that are likewise distinct, so the confrontation of two positions
> brings these insights and flaws to light where they might have remained
> unremarkable in the background throughout consideration of either in
> isolation. The limitations of each position as well as its strengths is
> more clearly accessible in the process of active juxtaposition that is
> discourse; we can accumulate the most effective considerations even as
> we unlearn what is baseless or faulty.
[ enter the ''topological manifold''? - 03AUG04 bdt ]

email Sat, 31 Jul 2004 11:56:34 -0300 

"Lewis (1981), in an important article on error, says, "Irrespective of how we react to failure, it occurs to most of us, when we meet it, to lament the weakness in our problem-solving armory. Almost inevitably, we find ourselves wondering if anything can be done to strengthen the problem solving methods at our disposal. And, whether we realize it or not, this is tantamount to wondering whether anything can be done to identify and remove errors in our thinking. The message of this article is that if error is at the root of all our problems, then it is high time that theorists started looking at the nature and genesis of error more carefully. They might even discover that, in the final analysis, the problem of error is the only problem there is." 

If Lewis is even approximately correct in his assessment of the importance of error detection, and if the traps of traditional logic and dialectics are as widespread as we suspect they are, then we have a large and very practical job ahead of us. The analysis of traps should lead us to review the question of what to expect from our conceptualization of any situation. There is perhaps an ultimate underlying trap in the belief that our verbal models are ever precise, accurate, or general at the same time. Perhaps our common belief could be called the Words Describe Reality Trap or the Words Can Do It Trap. 

It might be better to say that we move in a verbal world of more or less error. In an important sense, we almost always have at least one foot in one or more of the traps. Perhaps the best we can do is to work together to help each other to experience moments of less error." 

Lewis, B. 1981. An essay on error. Instructional Science 10, 237-257. 
Robert E. Horn
The Lexington Institute
http://www.stanford.edu/~rhorn/a/topic/phil /artclTrapsOfFormalLogic.html

"Codex books limit the wisdom of the Great Books to students who are Great Readers-as, to be sure, all of us who debate curricular matters were and are. Electronic text blows that limitation wide open. It offers new ways to democratize the arts, ways of the sort society is asking us to provide. If groups of people newly come to the world of liberal
learning cannot unpack the Silenus box of wisdom with the tools they bring, maybe we can redesign the box electronically, so that the tools they have, the talents they already possess, will suffice. We need not necessarily compromise the wisdom therein. " 

"The bit-mapped, graphics-based personal computer is, as I have argued in chapter 2, intrinsically a rhetorical device. In its memory storage and retrieval, in its dynamic interactivity, in the dramatic rehearsal-reality it creates, in the way game and play are built into its motival structure, it expresses the rhetorical tradition just as the codex book embodies the philosophical tradition. The computerís oscillation between reader and writer reintroduces the oscillation between literate and oral coordinates that stands at the center of classical Western literature. The electronic word will allow us to teach the classical canon with more understanding and zest than ever before. We donít need to worry about its impending destruction, or deconstruction. Western Lit is in no danger from Westerns. They are both going interactive. Indeed, by devising new ways to unlock the Western tradition for _nontraditional_ students, we may find out more about what its wisdom is and does, begin to answer that other pressing question, what are the arts and letters good for?" 

The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts
Richard A. Lanham
The University of Chicago Press

"Much of the little civic discussion we've heard about the political impact of the Net has focused on crime (thwarting theft or online predators), security (encryption), the rotting of young brains, intellectual property and commerce along with the usual predictions of impending chaos. 

Such issues are too narrow, suggests Mark Poster, who teaches at UCLA/Irvine. His essay, "Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere," appears in one of the best collections of techno-writing -- "Internet Culture", published several years ago, edited by David Porter and published by Routledge Press. 

Though the Net works with and extends existing social functions, Poster writes, "What are far more cogent as possible long-term political effects of the Internet are the ways in which it institutes new social functions," don't mesh easily with contemporary organizations and institutions. 

Existing politics and ideologies appear restrictive and antideluvian, especially in the face of cyberspace, which breeds diverse points of view, individual expression, and the kind of free flow of ideas almost nonexistent in Washington's Media/Politics machine. Political theorists and cyber-scholars argued a decade ago that traditional political authority and conventional two-party politics couldn't withstand so much individualistic thinking and grassroots participation. It's still not completely clear whether that's so." 


"The "magic" of the Internet is that it is puts "cultural acts, symbolizations in all forms, in the hands of all participants; it radically decentralizes the positions of speech, publishing, film-making, radio and television broadcasting..." 

One change likely to arise from cyber-democracy is that the nature of authority will change. The Net discourages endowing individuals with inflated status. Just look at scholarly research, being challenged and reformed by the dissemination of texts via the Net. Political authority, Poster argues, will be reformed in much the same way. This argument is a
bit problematic. Corporations are a lot more powerful and politically effective than academics. They manipulate politics and the law all the time, as the Microsoft experience and the free music wars have amply demonstrated. 

Cyber-democracy is as good a term for that process as any. Day by day, the Net is becoming the primary, increasingly universal public sphere in the United States, and will likely be for much of the rest of the world. Given the relentless decentralization of the Net, the moral and political authority of Washington-style politics and conventional media may be replaced by a more informal, rational, accountable system. No utopia, and the cybersphere will raise as many problems and challenges as it resolves. But week by week, the Jurassic-era Bush-Gore-Nader/media proceedings may be among the the last of their kind. Good riddance. 

Cyberdemocracy And The Public Sphere
Posted by JonKatz on Friday October 27, @10:30AM
From the ''the-last-days-of-poltics-(cont.)'' dept.

  1. Use published arguments. Only those arguments were included that have been published in an established print or electronic medium: journals (including reputable electronic journals and white papers), magazines, and books. Arguments made in Usenet newsgroups, electronic forums, e-mail exchanges, or in interpersonal debate were excluded as too ephemeral and as representing positions still in development. Such arguments will be excluded until they appear in a more established medium. 
  2. Use arguments that lie within the scope of the map. . . . Many threads of argument drift away from the central issue into such related territories as the mind­body problem, functionalism, and the philosophy of science. Such claims were set aside until a chance arises to map neighboring territories with maps of their own. 
  3. Seek out the historically earliest or best-known version of an argument. When different authors make similar arguments, we chose the version which was either historically earliest, or the best-known version of the argument. When the best-known version is used, the historically earliest version is usually mentioned in a note. In the few cases in which differing versions of an argument are sufficiently unique or separately disputed, each is summarized separately. 
  4. Avoid loosely drawn arguments. Sometimes an author makes an argument loosely, at the end of a paragraph, as an aside, or in a footnote. In general, such arguments are not included unless they are developed further in follow-up articles or are the focus of further debate. 
  5. Avoid repetitive, nitpicking, or duplicative arguments. One goal of the maps is facilitation of productive debate. Ad hominem arguments, redundant rounds of back-and-forth, and tediously nitpicky arguments were left out. 
  6. Avoid forbiddingly technical discussion. Highly technical arguments, which are based on extensive symbolic notation and formalisms, could not be represented with the cartographic conventions we developed, or at the scale we chose to work at. However, summaries of many technical and symbolic discussions were included. Only the most forbidding had to be excluded. 
  7. Summarize the author's published claim. Many authors hold views today that are different from those they expressed at the time they entered into the debate. We include authors' claims as published. If an author later changed his or her position, and published the change, the new claim was included and the change of position was noted. But if no new contribution has been made, then the original published view stands. 
  8. Include some historical arguments. In order to properly situate the debate in its historical context, we included a sampling of notable historical supports of contemporary arguments. 
  9. Include some experimental results. To situate the debate in a context of concrete experimental and computational results, we included some implemented systems AND empirical results. Again, we only included a small sample of such results, sticking to famous and notable computer models and experiments.

Criteria for Including Arguments in Mapping Great Debates

* Claims
Debates start with claims, which have been defined by Toulmin as assertions put forward publicly for general acceptance with the implication that there are underlying íreasonsí that could show them to be íwell foundedí and therefore entitled to be generally accepted. (Toulmin et. al., l979) Claims as we have written them are brief summaries, often accompanied by explanatory illustrations. Some readers have been thrown off in expecting the claim boxes to be abstracts of published works. But claims summarize individual arguments. As such, a given published article may be broken down into numerous claims on the
maps; alternately, a given claim may draw on information in several
published chapters and articles. Each claim is connected to the next by one of three links: supported by, disputed by, or interpreted as. 

*Supported by
We defined the supported by relationship slightly differently than Toulmin. These are arguments that uphold or defend another claim. Examples include: supporting evidence, further argumentation, thought experiments, extensions or qualifications, and implemented models. 

*Disputed by
These are charges made against another claim. Examples include: logical negations, counterexamples, attacks on an argumentís emphasis, potential dangers an argument might raise, thought experiments, and implemented models. 3f. Support and dispute carry a range of meanings Support and dispute are used in an argumentative sense rather than in a strict logical or epistemic sense. They structure the map into chains of agreement and disagreement where claimants respond to one another in a variety of affirmative and negative way. As such, the relations of support and dispute cover a wide range of cases, which fall into fuzzy categories or families of supportive and disputative responses. 

*Interpreted as
Sometimes an argument is reframed by one of the disputants. If there was a distinctive reconfiguration of an earlier claim, we used this icon. 

*Anticipated by
Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a potential attack on a previous argument that is raised by the author so that it can be disputed. 

*Links as arrows direct the eye
After experimenting with a number of formats, we decided to use arrows to show the paths of arguments, with icons showing whether the relationship was one of support, dispute, or interpretation. The directionality of a link, represented by an arrow, represents the direction in which the reader should read the claims for maximal effectiveness. The arrows direct the eye. Thus, links do not necessarily correspond to direct evidential support, logical negation, or any more crispy defined logical relation (though in particular cases a link may be any one of these). I should point out that we sometimes include what Toulmin would call grounds, warrants and backing in our claim boxes. We did this primarily to avoid more of a tangle of boxes and arrows than we already had. 

*Rebuttals and counterrebuttals
The rebuttal presents the possible exceptions or objections to the claim. There is no such thing as a debate without at least one rebuttal. And we followed that guideline as a criteria for choosing arguments to map. Debates then continue through a series of contributions that dispute previous claims and other rebuttals. The counterrebuttals may or may not be made by the original claimant. 


"[The intelligent machines debate is a prime example of the type of
argument that benefits particularly well from argumentation mapping.
From its beginning, the debate has been a truly interdisciplinary and global discussion, with philosophers, cognitive scientists, artificial intelligence researchers, and others joining in, from around the world. Nevertheless, great parts of the debate have taken place in journals that are isolated by the boundaries of particular academic disciplines. As a result, it has been difficult until now to see the structure of the debate as it unfolds. 

Argumentation maps provide a picture, more detailed than previously available, of how such a vast debate can take place across disciplinary and geographic distances. By creating an accessible map of the conceptual territory our hope is to facilitate more global interdisciplinary debate, to bring the various sources to light, and to illuminate how the pieces of the puzzle fit together. Perhaps the very existence of the maps will provide incentive and opportunity for more interdisciplinary and international discussion. 

In a world of global interdisciplinary discussion, effective communication and productive dialectical exchange are key. We need to elevate the coffee-house discussions and the Usenet dialogues into cooperative and productive exchanges that push our understanding forward. It is all too easy to repeat an argument that has already been made in a distant or obscure location, to talk past one another in the heat of conflict, or to ignore important context. Moving a serious debate forward requires a disciplined interdisciplinary and international dialectic." 

Horn, R.E. (1989). Mapping Hypertext: Analysis, Linkage, and Display of Knowledge for the Next Generation of On-line Text and Graphics. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Institute. 
Thomas, L. (1981). Debating the unknowable. Atlantic Monthly, July, 49-50. 
Toulmin, S. (1958). The Uses of Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Toulmin, S., R. Rieke, & A. Janik. (1979). An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan. 

Using Argumentation Analysis to Examine History and Status of a Major Debate in Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy
Robert E. Horn
Visiting Scholar
Center for the Study of Language and Information
Stanford University
California, U.S.A.


"The intellect understands; it is of male gender und its understanding is not a listening but an active grasping and gripping - so to speak. It proceeds from its settings or from measurable and seizable magnitudes that it reckons with. It refers mainly to the visible and can be called constructive as long as it is not used one-sidedly but in accordance
with reason. It subordinates itself to the more dividing than clarifying and therefore not harmless alternative of the ''either-or''. The results of its thinking process are either right or wrong. 

Reason listens (Vernunft - reason - is derived from Vernehmen - listening); it is of female gender - as was the goddess Athena thinking swiftly like an arrow and emanating from the head of Zeus. Her listening is a receiving, so-to-speak an enduring hearing which reflects on the messages listened to; so as the ear is not an acting organ but a receiving and quite female organ. It does not calculate, it has its sources in the basic Origin, and what it perceives originates sometimes from far away, often from the invisible of the heavens but also of the earth. With its tolerant and conciliate basic attitude of the ''as-well-as'' it is capable to match the polar manifestations of the living thinkable with common sense. The results of its thinking are right, almost right or wrong. 

Only where a thinking result is right as well as true it is binding. Only where the constructive intellectual thinking combines with the receiving reasoning, thinking becomes creative. The one without the other causes unilaterally only devastating intellectual instead of reasonable results, or negative chaotic rational instead of sound achievements." 

THE INVISIBLE ORIGIN - Evolution as a Supplementary Process
Jean Gebser
file:///C|/Documents/Rainbow Builder/gebser_InvisibleOrigin.html 

Bernard D. Tremblay (Ben) wrote in email on Sun, 25 Jul 2004 18:03:48 -0300:
> And so it's significant that participatory deliberation engages
> reason as well as intellect.

"The general skills of informal reasoning and argumentation, which in the following we simply call informal reasoning, are often ill-understood and poorly deployed, even among those in the upper tiers of our educational systems (Graf, 2003). In her important book The Skills of Argument, Deanna Kuhn reported on an extensive study of a wide range of people. She found that around half of her subjects did not successfully exhibit each of the major subskills of informal argumentation (Kuhn, 1991). For example, while participants readily held opinions on controversial matters, when asked to give evidence in support of their opinions, in over half of cases their responses did not constitute genuine evidence (let alone good evidence). Other studies have come up with similarly bleak results (Means & Voss, 1996; Perkins, 1985; Perkins, Allen, & Hafner, 1983). Of course, almost all people do have some informal reasoning ability. They can follow, and often produce, basic inferences such as "you canít get on the bus, because you donít have a ticket." They have fragmented abilities in
the range of argument skills investigated by Kuhn. These abilities are deployed in many everyday circumstances. Informal reasoning appears at quite an early age (Stein & Miller, 1993) and continues to develop through secondary and tertiary education (Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). A few people manage to become highly proficient. The problem, then, seems to be that the natural development of informal reasoning often peters out while skills are still incomplete." [emph added bdt] 

Graf, G. (2003). Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind. Kuhn, D. (1991). The Skills of Argument. Perkins, D. N. (1985). Postprimary education has little impact on informal reasoning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, 562-571. Perkins, D. N., Allen, R., & Hafner, J. (1983). Difficulties in everyday reasoning. In W. Maxwell & J. Bruner (Eds.), Thinking: The Expanding Frontier (pp. 177-189). 

Enhancing Expertise in Informal Reasoning
Tim van Gelder, Melanie Bissett
Department of Philosophy
University of Melbourne
Geoff Cumming - School of Psychological Sciences
La Trobe University

"Even apart from whether Iím right that Fair Deliberative Proceduralism ends up as an epistemic theory of legitimacy, notice that it grants important epistemic powers to public political discussion. It holds that by stating oneís views and arguments publicly and adjusting them in light of the responses one receives, a citizen will come to a more adequate view of her interests and concerns. Whatever explanation there might be for this-presumably it is some kind of faith in the powers of reason--would seem to be available to a more frankly epistemic account of legitimacy such as the Epistemic Proceduralism I support. On the account I favor, public discussion centrally includes dispute about justice and the common good themselves rather than merely each person pressing her own interests. But if the public forum allows a person to refine her view of her interests and concerns, it would presumably allow a person to refine her view of justice and the common good as well. Then we should wonder why, if substantive fairness or justice is the goal of the process, public discussion of that would not be more conducive to attaining it than a more limited discourse in which each tries only to form and pursue and enlightened conception of her own interests. 

We can make this objection in two steps. First, since the view attributes to democratic deliberation the epistemic virtue of refining peopleís views on the matters of interest that they bring to the discussion, it can hardly resist the suggestion that it would epistemically serve a discussion of justice or the common good if that question were taken up. After all, a discussion of the common good hardly precludes open discussion of sectional interests, since there is always the question what is due them in justice. So the granted refinement of interest conceptions already, by itself, would epistemically support deliberation on justice or the common good. 

Second, since the goal of the process is held to be substantively just outcomes, it is difficult to see how this could be better served by a discussion that ignores that question than it is by one that is devoted to it.

Third, it is difficult to make very strong epistemic claims even for a deliberative democratic process devoted to arriving at justice or the common good, so the epistemic claims that could be made on behalf of a process not so devoted must be weaker still, and so pretty weak. 

This is far from conclusive, but I think it suggests that a theory of democratic legitimacy that depends on the procedureís epistemic value will probably have to conceive of the procedure as self-consciously devoted to ascertaining substantive justice or the common good, albeit in light of full and frank entering of the various sectional interests that justice must accommodate." 

"There has recently been great interest among political theorists in what I shall call the deliberative question: why, and in what way, should political decision processes consist in wide public discussion culminating in formal procedures of voting? The voluminous and diverse interest in so-called deliberative democracy has many sources. Among the most interesting from a philosophical point of view are these two: first, it is partly a reaction to the apparent limits of existing a priori theories of rational social choice in explaining our commitments to the decision procedures typical of modern constitutional democracies; and second, it is partly a reaction to what was perceived by many as an overemphasis on the question of the correct principles of distributive justice, along with a relative neglect of the questions of legitimate authority raised by vast existing inequality among participants in modern political processes. 

Both of these roots of the deliberative democracy movement-call them social choice skepticism, and the alleged arrogance of justice theories -have encouraged the erection of a partition between questions of proper procedure and questions of proper decisions or outcomes. First, students of formal social choice theory came to doubt that there was anything good to be said about democratic outcomes on the basis of their having been produced by the aggregation of individual inputs, unless that mere procedural source could be shown to be good, in some way, in its own right. For those not willing to declare against democracy on this basis, attention would naturally turn to morally relevant features of procedures themselves apart from any tendencies to have good results. 

And, second, students of especially Habermas came to doubt that it was ever proper for a political theorist to preempt, as Rawls was said to do, the conclusions of a free and equal democratic discussion about justice.5 Instead, political philosophers should leave all questions of substantive justice to politics. This would leave only the task of prescribing a legitimate political process without presupposing the correctness or error of any particular substantive position. The new political ideal, after justice, has come to be deliberative democracy itself." [emph. added bdt] 

"From the idea that political theory ought not to say what democracies should decide, there has been a largely undefended shift to the philosophically deeper proposition that there is no standard of what democracies should decide, except, that is, whatever they actually do decide when functioning properly. This takes the new proceduralism one step further: not only should political theory prescind from opinions about what should be done politically (other than maintaining proper procedures); moreover, political theory, it is said, ought to provide an account of legitimate politics that does not depend on there being any appropriate standard for political decisions other than their having originated in a proper democratic procedure. 

The reason for this slide is not hard to see. The Habermasian concern about the "monological" preempting by political philosophers of genuine political choice is, at root, an objection to the privileging of any particular citizenís normative perspective. In a free society of equals, the philosopherís claim to expertise is and ought to be politically contestable. 

And yet, if there were genuine procedure-independent standards of justice it is hard to believe that no one would be any more expert than anyone else. How could that be? Whether or not philosophers have a claim to special knowledge, surely some citizens will be better than others (for, surely some are worse) on any matter about which some opinions are correct and others mistaken. The idea of procedure-independent standards of political decisions may seem to lead inexorably, then, to the legitimacy of rule by the genuine experts, whomever they may be. The choice can seem to be between epistocracy, or rule by the wise, on the one hand, and deep proceduralism, the denial that such independent standards exist, on the other. If only it can be established that there is no genuine substance in the first place, then the proceduralist flight from substance is complete. Deliberative democracies are then existentially free and self-determining. The value of democratic deliberation is vindicated by making democratic deliberation itself the final political value." 

5 See, e.g., Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," MIT 1990, p. 66. 

Democratic Authority: Toward a Philosophical Framework
David Estlund
Philosophy, Brown University
January 17, 2000
Conference on "Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy"
University of Texas, Austin
4-6 February 2000.
file:///C|/Documents/Discourse /DemocraticAuthority.pdf 

"Deliberative democracyís legitimation problems are compounded here to the degree elections themselves are not exactly deliberative affairs even for those who do participate in them - deliberation often has to be subordinated to strategy in the interests of winning. One way to avoid this anti-deliberative aspect of election campaigns is to select deliberators by lot - as is done for Fishkinís (1991, 1995) deliberative opinion polls, for citizen juries, for Dahlís (1985) proposed "minipopulus", and for Burnheimís (1985) proposed "demarchy". Such forums are usually constituted on an issue-specific basis, and their role but advisory - though there is no reason why they could not be decisive, or indeed act as general-purpose legislatures. 

Random sampling of the relevant population followed by deliberation gives a simulation of what the population as a whole would decide if everyone were allowed to deliberate. This claim is persuasive. However, it does not entirely solve the legitimation problem, because decisions still have to be justified to those who did not participate. Still, such justification ought to be easier than for elections - provided that enough of the population could come to understand the logic of random sampling. One problem that may arise is that deliberative polls and citizen juries normally require that well-defined boundaries can be drawn around issues. Sometimes they can (for example, when it comes to a constitutional question such as the Australian transition from monarchy to presidency), but for some issues there will be a variety of important interactions across issues (for example, concerning issues of free trade and capital mobility, which have major ramifications for environmental affairs and social justice). 

Rawls (1993, 1997) specifies deliberative practice in terms of the exercise of public reason, a standard for the substantive content of arguments, which have to be framed in terms that can be accepted by all, thus excluding self-interest and partial perspectives. Public reason for Rawls is singular and universal: its terms are identical for all, and all individuals who exercise it will reach the same conclusions. Public reason is defined by a body of principles that people must accept before they enter a political setting, not what they will be prompted to discover after they have entered the public arena (see Benhabib, 1996, p. 75). Any reflective individual can reach the correct conclusions, and so all that is really needed is one individual to deliberate about its content. If some people are better able to reflect than others, perhaps political philosophers and legal theorists, then they should be the ones to whom society entrusts public reason." 

"The key constraint here is one of economy. Goodin (2000) points out in his contribution to this conference (following Dahl and many others) that meaningful participation in deliberation by anything more than a tiny minority in a process of collective decision is inconceivable in contemporary nation states (and, indeed, in most of their component units). The demands on time are simply impossible in anything beyond a very small scale political unit. As Walzer (1999, p. 68) puts it, "deliberation is not an activity for the demos" 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 100,000, canít plausibly "reason together."" 

"[The paper specifies] the public sphere as the most important location for deliberation, and conceptualize deliberation itself as a multifaceted interchange or contestation across discourses within the public sphere. Discursive legitimacy is then secured to the extent that collective outcomes are responsive to the balance of competing discourses in the public sphere, to the extent that this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent control." 

Dahl, Robert A. 1985. Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
Goodin, Robert E. 2000. Democratic Deliberation Within. Paper presented to the Conference on "Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy", University of Texas, Austin, 4-6 February 2000. 
Walzer, Michael. 1999. Deliberation, and What Else? 58-69 in Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. 

John S. Dryzek
presented to the Conference on "Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy"
University of Texas, Austin, 4-6 February 2000.
file:///C|/Documents/Discourse /DeliberativeEconomyDiscursiveLegitimacy.pdf 

"Chandrakirti (see Peter Fenner, The Ontology of the Middle Way, Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Pub.Co., 1991, p.254) explains that concepts are unable to withstand examination because things arise in dependence on their relations (with other things). 

''Therefore, the reasoning of relational origination cuts through the entire web of harmful options.''" 

Deconstructive Contemplation: Dissolving Fixations Through Insight and Detachment
file:///C|/Documents/Rainbow Builder/metagnosis/Deconstructive_Contemplation/deconstruct.html 

"The difference, I submit, is that the forms of organization of knowledge in electronic media sharply disresemble those of the traditional codex book. The methods of production and distribution disresemble those of the print media even more sharply. Where the traditional function of the library has been to be one of a few such enterprises cooperating (if sometimes at arm's length) with a few publishers (and thus both together functioning as gatekeepers on a limited set of narrow information pathways from authors to readers), a community is now growing in which there will be as many publishers as readers. The possibility even of imagining totality in such a world rapidly disintegrates." 

James J. O'Donnell
The Virtual Library: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed. Gateways, Gatekeepers, and Roles in the Information Omniverse:
Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium, Association of Research Libraries
Washington, DC.
file:///C|/Documents/argumaps/pkp /pkp_sun-research_overview.html 

Notes by David Ing:
Had the complete works of Darwin on a CD. Activated the search function! The Descent of Man (later than Origin of Species) looks at developments at the level of man. 
"Survival of the Fittest" only appears twice in Descent of Man, one of which is to say that he over-emphasized "Survival of the Fittest" in the Origin of Species!

What else is there instead?

  • "Love" came up 95 times 
  • competition came up 9 times 
  • 19th Century synonyms of cooperation (e.g., mutuality) came up 24 (?) times 
  • "rule by selfish-genes" -- "a base principal accounting for the low morality of savages" 
  • the idea of blind chance is "abhorent" -- repeated several times in the book and in private letters 
  • again and again he insists that what drives man is morality, the desire for us to help one another, desire to do what is right rather than wrong 
  • "morality is the major evolutionary drive" as a theme appears 90 times"

This material is from "THE PRIMER PROJECT" A Special Integration Group (SIG) of the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS) originally SGSR, Society for General Systems Research.and IISII INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE for SYSTEMIC INQUIRY AND INTEGRATION Presents An activity of the Primer Group
file:///C|/Documents/Rainbow Builder/metagnosis/sysquote.htm 

Only when knowledge is justified should it be used in social formations and taught as a fact able to influence the _sustainable harmonisation of life_ on Earth. This justification is never final and therefore more than a linear "calculus" of mentals is necessary to understand the cognitive mechanism of reason and its inclination towards the unconditional ('';das Unbedingte''; - cf. Kant). Wisdom becomes possible by allowing all possible interactions between both approaches of our physical brain, i.e. digital, linear, sequential & verbal versus analogous, chaotic, parallel and non-verbal. Philosophy starts with mentals and is optimised by the stern training of the rational mind focused on _the global, universal, cosmic meaning of humanity_.Logic and epistemology formulating the norms of thought and knowledge. Next the intellect may join. 

Towards a moderate, modular Postmodernism
file:///C|/Documents/Rainbow Builder /metagnosis/po_mo.htm 

In our wired world, data and information (which might be defined as 'raw' data that has been structured and represented for the human senses) have never been so easy to access and store. Globally, it's estimated that 1-2 exabytes of data is now being generated each year, almost all of it in purely digital form. Not surprisingly, this info-bonanza is experienced all too frequently not as a boon, but as a burden. We are not just swimming but drowning in data. Managers, researchers or workers have to grope their way through the 'infosmog' before reaching their decisions, confident of one thing alone: they have not taken everything properly into account. We find ourselves in this situation because whilst accessing and storing data and information is technically cheap and relatively straightforward, interpreting it requires intellectual investment: attention, time, expertise and experience are now the commodities in highest demand and shortest supply. Veterans and other experts are so valued because they make sense of information, seeing patterns, implications and connotations that others miss. Knowledge, like beauty, is thus in the eye of the beholder: 'one man's data is another man's knowledge'. 

So, in contrast to information, let's be pragmatic and define knowledge as information sufficiently interpreted to enable action. Everything is information until it is interpreted and enables some form of action (even if only to decide that it is irrelevant). Even if accessible one click away, until it is interpreted - by a human or a machine - it is meaningless, and thus useless. When information is interpreted, then it
can be matched with, and brought to bear upon, the particular problems your business or organisation is addressing. To turn your information into actionable knowledge, it is necessary to understand the connections between it and your business processes. This brings us to the kinds of pressing questions now facing organisations: what information to use when, how to find it, who may know, who may already have rated its significance, how to present it to the right people in the right form at the right time, etc. 

Advanced Knowledge Technologies Manifesto

"Web pages, forums, e-mail and FTP are successful because they support the basic needs for exchange, communication and collaboration. While simple web technology does enable creative educational scenarios it has 2 drawbacks: (1) Maintaining static web-sites is timeconsuming and simple discussion systems do bad knowledge management. (2) More sophisticated scenarios (like co-authoring or work-flow) are badly supported." 


"Empirical research (e.g. Dillenbourg 1999) reveals that collaborative or collective constructivist learning is not per se an effective learning method. It is more effective if individuals and groups have to evolve within well-specified scenarios, i.e. sequences of phases within which group members do tasks and play specific roles. While teachers can orchestrate complex scenarios with very little technology, the effort can soon become cumbersome. 

Remember 1993ís slogan of "shifting the focus from teaching to facilitating"? Todays "E-learning" systems are mostly anchored in the behaviorist CBT tradition. They focus on content delivery and the teacherís "facilitator" role is degraded to deal with web contents, quizzes and grading. They fail to support rich socio-constructivist scenarios engaging students in active project-based learning. Therefore we argue that R&D in educational software should not just focus on improving passive "interactive" courseware but on tools supporting students to solve more complex and open-ended tasks." 

Community, Content and Collaboration Management Systems: Socio-Constructivist Scenarios for the Masses?
Daniel Schneider, Catherine Frété, Paraskevi Synteta TECFA, Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences de líEducation Université de Genève
{Daniel.Schneider | Catherine.Frete | Paraskevi.Synteta}
    @tecfa.unige.ch file:///C|/Documents/argumaps/tecfa_edmedia2002.pdf 

Since many documents and educational opportunities can be found only
online, those unable to get access to them will be left behind (Raber and Budd 1999, 192; Eve and Brophy 2000, 11). Thus, by denying the importance of providing Internet and other related IT services, the public library will be contributing inadvertently to a new class of information `have nots'. In the new information age, this for many would be considered un-democratic. 

The battle for democracy then, in terms of free and open access to information, is being fought in the stacks of US public libraries. The image of the library is as much at the heart of this struggle as any democratic values. As Raber and Budd (1999, 180) suggest, "images can be tools to affect reality...public images of libraries become political weapons whose deployment may play a significant role in library development." 

The weapons are being used. One of the perhaps unexpected players in this scheme is the computer/IT industry, which has managed, through sophisticated marketing campaigns, to almost firmly erase any compatibility between the new purveyors of information - themselves - and the traditional holders of that mandate, librarians. The advertising campaigns launched by these companies may be currently winning the public perception war that libraries, while good places to take small children for story time, are behind the times for serious, up-to-date and efficient information gathering (Raber and Budd 1999, 182; Bales 1998). It may be that they have some librarians convinced as well (Vavrek 1999). 

Heidi Julien
Libraries as Instruments of Information Policy: The Role of Canadian Public Libraries in `Connecting Canadians' 
School of Library and Information Studies
University of Alberta, Edmonton
and Michelle Helliwell
School of Library and Information
Studies Dalhousie University

"Instead of looking forward to a day when justice will be won, declare that we are living in a just world right now. Declare that we are simply fighting for more justice. 

Movements, as such, are obsolete. They are incompatible with a renaissance sensibility because of the narrative style of their intended unfolding. They yearn forward towards salvation in the manner of utopians or fundamentalists: an increasing number of people are becoming aware of how movements of all stripes justify tremendous injustice in the name of that deferred future moment. People are actually taken out of their immediate experience and their connection to the political process as they put their heads down and do battle. It becomes not worth believing in anything. 

This is why we have to advocate living in the now in order to effect any real change. There should be no postponement of joy. Once we start down this path, there can be no stopping. We begin to see the unreality of money.We begin to see how Ďsalvationí has been traded in for Ďretirementí as the new ultimate goal for which Westerners suspend their lives and their ethics. (People work for companies they hate, and then invest in corporations whose ethics they detest, in order to guarantee a good retirement.) We see the artificial obstacles to appropriate energy policy, international relations, urban planning and affordable healthcare as what they are: artificial.Meanwhile, what we can accomplish presents itself on a much more realistic scale when we engage with it in the moment and on a local level." 

Douglas Rushkoff
Open Source Democracy - How online communication is changing offline politics p. 64

"Bernard D. Tremblay" wrote:
> Our task? To disentangle the strings of marks and noises that is public
> discourse. 

email Mon, 05 Jul 2004 17:55:46 -0300 

"Rather than viewing language as mirroring a separately given reality, a situated view tends to see it as a means for social coordination and adaptation (Mead, 1934; Winograd and Flores, 1986). As Rorty (1991b, p. 4), puts it, language can be seen as "strings of marks and noises which organisms use as tools for getting what they want." Viewed in this way, it makes no sense to think of linguistic utterances as truths or falsehoods depending on whether they mirror separately described objects, for knowledge is not a matter of mirroring. It is the product of a particular process of inquiry arising within a situation which allows action to carry on (Dewey and Bentley, 1949). Thus, in this interpretation, knowledge is inseparable from the occasions and activities of which it is the product

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., and Duguid, P. (1989).
Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32-42.
Eric Bredo
University of Virginia (1994?)

"Bernard D. Tremblay" wrote:
> Financing OpenSource has traditionally come from individuals' "sweat
> equity", supplemented by funding from commercial entities who stood to
> benefit by increased profits from conventional commodities.
> What I am pressing here is the possibility of development financed by
> the ultimate beneficiaries, that is, the eventual customers would become
> not only subscribers but actual participants contributing user
> specifications and stories as well as funds. It is my anticipation that
> this participatory relationship will ramify forward and downward,
> eventually implicating the end consummers themselves.
> This boot-strap method, properly implemented and skilfully executed, has
> a single weak-link: there is the requirement to prime the pump.
> The end result will be a system of discourse that will on one hand
> manifest as ubiquitously as chat-rooms and discussion forums (doing so
> with the remarkable absence of manipulative rhetoric that is central to
> the project's validity) but also a repository of common knowledge that
> presents the received practice in a way that makes more accessible the
> received wisdom.

email Mon, 05 Jul 2004 15:57:45 -0300 

Of significant importance is that dialectical maps treat valence super-simplistically and by doing so avoid some very subtle confounds; by having "pro" and "con" only the system avoids mistakenly identifying as equivalent emotions and reactions of the same valence, viz."given the centrality of valence to emotion, valence-based approaches might by default predict that distinct emotions of the same valence, such as sadness, anger, and fear, would exert similar influences on judgment and choice. 

[....] Valence-based approaches may sacrifice specificity in the service of parsimony (c.f. Higgins, 1997)" 

Jennifer S. Lerner, Dacher Keltner
Carnegie Mellon University and University of California, Berkeley
Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fiske/facets /lerner&keltner_beyond_valence.htm 

"Bernard D. Tremblay" wrote:
> In an American Psychologist article on scientific realism there's a
> reference to Feyerbend on anarchic science ("Against Method"?); into the
> anarchy of hypothesis testing we inject a method that transforms it into
> productive chaos.
> As with scientific visualization, results and partial products are
> presented in a way that is more informative and meaningful without
> increasing the actual amount of data. This is done by maximizing the
> display of inherent relations. The premises and propositions under
> consideration are shown in the context of their supporting reasons and
> objections. Paradigmatic arguments, perhaps self-evident to the point of
> seeming trite to the knowledgable, serve to inform the more naive will
> acting as portal elements for both.

email Mon, 05 Jul 2004 15:15:37 -0300 

"Context is "...the pattern that connects...all communication necessitates context...without context there is no meaning."

Bateson, G. (1978). "The pattern which connects." Co-Evolution Quarterly, 18, 4-15. p. 13
Quoted in "Give a Context by Any Other Name: Methodological tools for taming the unruly beast"
Brenda Dervin, PhD.
Keynote paper at: ISIC 96: INFORMATION SEEKING IN CONTEXT, Conference on Research in Information Needs, Seeking, and Use in Different Contexts
Department of Information Studies
University of Tampere
Finnish Association of Library and Information Science - August 14-16, 1996

"It appears that all units of reality are comprised of two basic elements in an asymmetrical binary relationship in dynamic interaction..." (p.38) "As noted above, one of the basic ideas that underlies my thinking, one of the images I have in mind when I contemplate the universe, is that it is constructed upon a simple pattern of order that may be seen in any and all phenomena, no matter how complex. The simple pattern is that of a binary relationship, recognized in a binary system. The implication here is that everything in nature, everything in the universe, is composed of networks of two elements, or two parts in functional relationship to each other..."(p.39) "The most fundamental phenomenon in the universe is relationship."(p.44) 

Jonas Salk
The Anatomy of Reality 


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