{"id":582,"date":"2003-01-25T23:27:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-25T23:27:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/?p=355"},"modified":"2003-01-25T23:27:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-25T23:27:00","slug":"355-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/archives\/582","title":{"rendered":"Imported from MozDawg without title"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><b><i>FUD This<\/i>, Bill!<\/b><br \/>\n<b>Matrix Event Advisory &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.matrixnetsystems.com\/ea\/index.jsp\">Slammer Worm Attack<\/a> status 23:37Z 25JAN03: Ongoing<\/b>; see <a href=\"http:\/\/isc.incidents.org\/analysis.html?id=180\" target=\"_blank\">Internet Storm Center event analysis<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\nBecause M$ SQL Server 2000 needs to be tucked in (&#8220;turn off Microsoft SQL servers until all current patches are applied; block ports UDP 1433 and 1434&#8221;), otherwise it&#8217;s a train wreck waiting for someone to act nasty, global web reachability dived below 75% around midnight EST. <br \/>\n<center><a href=\"http:\/\/chebucto.ca\/Current\/AEF\/raps\/blog\/reachability.gif\" target=\"_blank\"> <img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"http:\/\/chebucto.ca\/Current\/AEF\/raps\/blog\/reachability_s.gif\" width=\"320\" height=\"181\" border = \"0\"><\/a><br \/>\n<font size=\"-1\"><i>click for 1800Z 25JAN03 fullsize<\/i> [thanks to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.matrixnetsystems.com\/index.jsp\">MatrixNetSystems<\/a> for their fine work])<\/font><\/center><\/p>\n<p>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/www.matrixnetsystems.com\/ea\/index.jsp\">Matrix NetSystem reports<\/a> &#8220;ISS MSS (Managed Security Services) has recorded 2.5 million attacks from 12 a.m. to 3 a.m. EST (GMT-5) on January 25, 2003.&#8221; The <a href=\"http:\/\/isc.sans.org\/\">Internet Storm Center<\/a> graph shows a peak of &#8220;7985 packets \/ sources \/ targets per minute&#8221;:<br \/>\n<center><a href=\"http:\/\/isc.sans.org\/port1434start.gif\" target=\"_blank\"> <img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"http:\/\/chebucto.ca\/Current\/AEF\/raps\/blog\/1434_s.gif\" width=\"320\" height=\"150\" border = \"0\"><\/a><br \/>\n<font size=\"-1\"><i>click for fullsize<\/i> [thanks to <a href=\"http:\/\/isc.sans.org\/\">ISC<\/a> for their fine work])<\/font><\/center><\/p>\n<p>\n&#8230; at its peak, packet loss touched 16%. <i>Viz<\/i>.:<br \/>\n<center><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"http:\/\/chebucto.ca\/Current\/AEF\/raps\/blog\/packet_loss.gif\" width=\"320\" height=\"152\" border = \"0\"><\/center><\/p>\n<p>\nAt one point I saw latency on UUDP reach &#8220;BIG&#8221; (if 1500 mSec is &#8220;critical&#8221;, then what latency is characterised as &#8220;BIG&#8221;?!) <i>Viz<\/i>.:<br \/>\n<center><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" src=\"http:\/\/chebucto.ca\/Current\/AEF\/raps\/blog\/internet_health.jpg\" width=\"320\" height=\"478\" border = \"0\"><\/center><\/p>\n<p>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/isc.sans.org\/port_details.html?port=1434\">ISC&#8217;s &#8220;port report&#8221;<\/a> (which also carries some revealing data graphs) describes two different 1434 attacks: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p><font size=\"-1\">CAN-2002-0650 &#8211; The keep-alive mechanism for Microsoft SQL Server 2000 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (bandwidth consumption) via a &#8220;ping&#8221; style packet to the Resolution Service (UDP port 1434) with a spoofed IP address of another SQL Server system, which causes the two servers to exchange packets in an infinite loop. [&#8220;Single ms-sql servers have been reported to generate traffic in excess<br \/>\nof 50 MBit\/sec. after being infected.&#8221; h_b]<\/p>\n<p>\nCAN-2002-0649 &#8211; Multiple buffer overflows in SQL Server 2000 Resolution Service allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary code via UDP packets to port 1434 in which (1) a 0x04 byte causes the SQL Monitor thread to generate a long registry key name, or (2) a 0x08 byte with a long string causes heap corruption.<\/font><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\nSources:<br \/>\nPrimary: <a href=\"http:\/\/isc.incidents.org\/analysis.html?id=180\">ISC Incident Analysis<\/a> &#8230; the <b>must read<\/b>. (RTFA?)<br \/>\nOthers: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nextgenss.com\/advisories\/mssql-udp.txt\">MSSQL-UDP Advisory<\/a> from <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nextgenss.com\/research.html\">NGSSoftware Insight Security Research<\/a> ([M$&#8217;s] &#8220;SQL Server 2000 exhibits two buffer overrun vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a remote attacker without ever having to authenticate to the server. What further exacerbates these issues is that the attack is channeled over UDP.&#8221;); <a href=\"http:\/\/www.internetpulse.net\/\">Internet Health Report<\/a> (n.b.: UUNET is still reporting some critical latency as I blog this); <a href=\"http:\/\/average.matrix.net\/\">Matrix NetSystems: Internet Average<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/gtoc.iss.net\/issEn\/delivery\/gtoc\/index.jsp\">Internet Security Center: Current Internet Threat Level<\/a> (it was Crit4 this afternoon); <a href=\"http:\/\/www.internettrafficreport.com\/main.htm\">Network Overview | Internet Traffic Report<\/a> (showed Asia getting thrashed); <a href=\"http:\/\/www.digitaloffense.net\/worms\/mssql_udp_worm\/\">The Digital Offense<\/a> with some worm source and notes<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\nFor discussion, I&#8217;d suggest two <b><a href=\"http:\/\/slashdot.org\">\/.<\/a><\/b> threads: <a href=\"http:\/\/slashdot.org\/article.pl?sid=03\/01\/25\/1245206\">the one from 7AM Saturday<\/a> (&#8220;Since about midnight EST almost every host on the internet has been receiving a 376 byte UDP payload on port ms-sql-m (1434) from a random infected server. &#8220;) and a second one I found just now: <a href=\"http:\/\/slashdot.org\/comments.pl?sid=51901\">DDoS for Fun and Profit<\/a> (&#8220;First there&#8217;s the Microsoft worm, reported earlier [above], which in addition to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.msnbc.com\/news\/864184.asp\">all the other damage<\/a> has apparently knocked Microsoft&#8217;s Windows XP activation servers [see my rant, below, which includes an exceprt from <i>M$ &#8221;Maintenance&#8221;<\/i>] (and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/articles\/A43267-2003Jan25.html\">Bank of America ATMs<\/a>) off the net. Then we&#8217;ve got a report about the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.internetnews.com\/dev-news\/article.php\/1573551\">ongoing demise of DALnet<\/a> &#8230; And Canada discovers <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cbc.ca\/stories\/2003\/01\/25\/ndp_delay030125\">a risk to online voting<\/a>.&#8221; Note: I happened to be listening to the New Democratic Party&#8217;s leadership convention live: yes, they did use Web voting; and yes, they did encounter problems consistent with this worm [were they using M$ $erver $000?. Happily, things worked out very well.])<\/p>\n<p>\n&lt;rant>Now, what kind of bottom-feeding Enron type says, &#8220;Oh, well, we don&#8217;t call it a bug&#8221; and then goes on his merry way, pulling down management salary as a software engineer. You think I&#8217;m blowing smoke? Dig this, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hardocp.com\/\">&#8220;M$ Maintenance&#8221;, from hardocp.com<\/a> :<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;<font size=\"-1\">It\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s 2:20 CST and I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m trying to activate a copy of XP. I need to, because this repair\/upgrade (changed mb, disk controller, video, hdisk, NIC, RAM, USB revision, CPU, etc) I can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t logon without activation.<br \/>\nExcept, I CAN\u00e2\u20ac\u2122T ACTIVATE. I am told there is no way ANY copy of XP can be activated in the next 5 hours because of (drum roll)<br \/>\n** Routine maintenance **. I mean, I asked: I said<br \/>\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153You don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have some little stand-alone machine that reads a DVD database so you could stand in line and do it?\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<br \/>\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153You don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have a couple hundred \u00e2\u20ac\u0153last resort\u00e2\u20ac\u009d number ranges? You can call me back tomorrow!!!\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<br \/>\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153There\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s not some guy you can go ask? Ya can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t call Bill at home?\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<br \/>\nSo, I gotta stop my project for some unknown length of time. Good thing I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m not updating a medical drug interaction database, or an available transplant database, or a process flow control system or a hazardous atmosphere measurement system or a BUNCH of other possibilities. In my case, either I miss the superbowl, or my car dealer can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t find and order Volvo cars on Monday. Life will continue.<br \/>\nBut, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m still seriously pissed. Call \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcem at 888-571-2048 and try for activation.<br \/>\nAnd let\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s think about the true meaning of the fact you can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t release liability for the consequential damage resulting from negligence. I mean, I have NEVER heard about \u00e2\u20ac\u0153routine maintenance\u00e2\u20ac\u009d on the 24.7.365 activation promise\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6<br \/>\nWell, on to the next job\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6<\/font>&#8220;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\nWhen the credibility balance between commercial and open source products became a thread in <a href=\"http:\/\/lists.evolt.org\/archive\/\">evolt&#8217;s [thelist]<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/lists.evolt.org\/archive\/Week-of-Mon-20030120\/133258.html\">David Kaufman put together an assessment<\/a> that included this block:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;<font size=\"-1\">CNN spared MS the embarassment of pointing out that this security flaw in<br \/>\none of Microsoft&#8217;s flagship products, finally noticed and patched last summer (july of 2002) had previously existed in the SQL Server 2000 code for 2 and a half years, completely undetected and, according to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/security\/bulletin\/MS02-039.asp\">the relevant MS security bulletin<\/a>, the same bug also has also existed and reamined undetected in MSDE 2000, the &#8220;MS Data Engine&#8221; which shipped originally in October of 1998 (as part of Access 2000, per <a href=\"http:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/presspass\/features\/1998\/10-21msde.asp\">MS press release<\/a>) and has now been on the market as production code for over three years.<br \/>\nIn addition to SQL Server 2000 (Developer, Standard, and Enterprise Editions), the bug also affects just a couple of other MS tools, as well, according to[ this <a href =\"http:\/\/isc.incidents.org\/analysis.html?id=180\">Internet Storm Center report<\/a>].<br \/>\n[ &#8230; ]<br \/>\nyet amazingly, each of the well-paid teams of Microsoft developers responsible for reviewing the code for all of these core MS products have underwhelmed us once again by failing to review the un-sexier code bits to unearth this internet-stopping buffer overflow vulnerability, for years, allowing hackers to exploit it in yet another astonishingly newsworthy DDOS attack brought to you by Microsoft bugs.<br \/>\nah well. no one&#8217;s perfect. not even a staff and a salary can replace simply giving a shit, now can it? i guess i&#8217;d just prefer my buffer overflows to be pointed out to me by self-styled volunteer security pundits causally perusing my open source code [ &#8230; ] <\/a><\/font>&#8220;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\nAny wonder why kidz are bummed at their future prospects? You want your son or daughter caught in a 9\/11 type attack? How about the image of him or her being hammered in the chest by a rocket-propelled grenade as s\/he scrambles for cover behind some gawd-forsaken rock in some gawd forsaken desert fighting for some gawd-forsaken corporate power struggle? Get righteous!!<\/p>\n<p>\nLike democracy itself, the &#8216;net is vulnerable to short-sightedly self-indulgent ineptitude. You can quote me on that.&lt;\/rant><\/p>\n<p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>FUD This, Bill! Matrix Event Advisory &#8211; Slammer Worm Attack status 23:37Z 25JAN03: Ongoing; see Internet Storm Center event analysis<a href=\"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/archives\/582\" class=\"searchmore\">Read the Rest&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n<div class=\"clr\"><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/582"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=582"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/582\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=582"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=582"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gnodal.protension.com\/journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=582"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}